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Dreaming

Dreams exist as a part of almost all people’s experience, as a kind of companion to
waking life. Our life in sleep, if you were to title that the window in which we are not awake,
where we rest from the world around us, consists of these collections of images, sounds,
conversations, sequences, and sensations that, while we dream, appear to us as being real,
but which we identify upon waking as being otherwise. Dreams are a near universal of lived
experiences: all people sleep (however sparingly), and during most peoples’ sleeping hours,
they conjure up for themselves a dream in which they become enrapt. But often those things
that one ‘experiences’ when they are asleep, engulfed in a dream, things that register as vivid,
lurid, convincing, engrossing—real—cannot be recalled by the dreamer after waking, or at
least can only be recalled in the vaguest of senses. But while anyone you might ask about
dreaming knows the experience intimately, has had presumably countless dreams throughout
their life (with some exceptions, perhaps, although the overwhelming majority of people
have dreamt at one point or another, and have likely dreamt many, many times), giving
explanation to the phenomenon, and pinning down in that explanation some ‘sense’ as to
what dreams are, some essence as to what those vivid imagined scenarios into which we are
submerged while we sleep that is defining of the dream, that all different discrete dreams
experienced over one lifetime—across all experiences of life by all people—share, proves
difficult to anyone. In trying to answer this question, A person may describe dreams that
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have repeated themselves throughout their life, or things they’ve noticed consistently in the
many different dreams they've had, or the manner in which they wake from their dreams and
return to their conscious life. But these would be only little ripples of the experience of
dreaming, that the person answering may take to gesture towards something critical and
constant seated deep, deep beneath the surface.
Tracking from these ripples their origin point, and the origin point for the whole of
the phenomenon of dreaming, proves incredibly difficult. Indeed, a person asked to give a
common-sense explanation of “what a dream is,” after supplying those observations they’ve
made for themselves about their own dreams, about something at once second-nature to
being alive and totally beguiling, would turn likely away from the question and treat it as
unanswerable. But before arriving at such a point, they’d likely make note of dreaming being
a private experience; some may even suggest that dreams are private across all cases, and that
this feature—if not the essence of dreaming—is one that is essential to dreaming.

I - Are Dreams Private?

Wittgenstein writes in the middle of his arguments against private language, during
his investigation of pain language in relation to sensation conveyance and privacy, that: “The
sentence “Sensations are private” is comparable to “One plays patience by oneself
(Wittgenstein p248)”. The aphorism appears as a kind of closing to a line of investigation
into the actual nature of sensation, where Wittgenstein demonstrates through interrogations of
language usage that sensations are, by their nature, not things that can be known by an
individual, as the term “know” as it is used in its conventional sense, is semantically
incongruous with the nature of an actual sensation, and therefore sensation cannot be the
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kind of thing of which someone would speak about “knowing” (which Wittgenstein argues
is obvious, since a person does not say “I know I’m having a pain sensation,” but instead
says “I am in pain”). To call pain private, then, in the way the sentence above demonstrates,
is both to say something obvious and to presume something strikingly wrong in doing so.
Pain, by its nature, is an internal experience, not something that exists in some form
independent from the individual experiencing it. And to say that, “pain is private” is to imply
that pain is something that exists independently from the individual experiencing pain,
something that can be observed, that is externalized. The above-quoted statement, already
the kind of thing that’s so revelatory that it’s practically mystifying in what it foregrounds
about language and experience, offers a kind of suggestion about how we naturally consider
cognition and “sense-data” (visual images, sensation, auditory experiences, interior stimuli
and responses to exterior stimuli, etc.) that is shrouded by our thinking within language. And
what this one-sentence conclusion suggests, when taken in relation to dreams (as cognitive
processes, or as we often term them, “experiences”), offers an array of revelations to some
of those issues most fundamental to dream appraisal and dream interpretation, revelations
intimately connected to our experiences of visual perception1.
People operate on the presumption that dreams are private, that the very
phenomenon of dreaming is patently a private phenomenon. This is to say that people
conceive of dreams as being things which, because of how they are experienced by an
individual (during sleep), and because of the nature of that experience2, and of which there is
no record, because they appear to a single individual and their qualities are determined by an
1

These issues will be explored extensively in the later chapters of this investigation, both in
relation to seeing and in relation to interpretation. For now, we are only making note of
them, as they stem from removing the issue of privacy from our conception of the dream.
2
Where the dream itself consists of an array of different “stimuli” that appear in our state of
sleep very much like those sensations we experience in waking life, but which correspond
with nothing real, as one would typically put it.
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array of factors that are context-specific and almost wholly unique to the individual, which
are mediated by that individual’s predisposed concerns and personality. Now these different
facets of the experience of dreaming that impel people to call dreams private experiences are
indeed all qualities of dreams, but none of them are singularly a quality of all dreams, and
none of them, likewise, are necessarily defining qualities of dreams. Furthermore, describing
dreams principally in these terms, in terms related explicitly to privacy, would strike
somebody as missing the actual nature of dreaming, since a dream, much like pain, is the
kind of thing to which the matter of privacy doesn’t hold any position of relation. By the
very description supplied above, a dream occurs for an individual, assembled from the
trappings of their biography and the points of consideration—from the most banal to the
most pressing—that take immediacy in their everyday life (whether the dreamer is aware of
that immediacy or not), where, while the unspooling of that dream may very well hold great
gravity and “reality” for the individual, it occurs internally, having no bearing on the exterior
world, and therefore offering no opportunity for another person to experience directly—or
maybe more aptly to engage with the dream with complete primacy (where the dream feels
real, where it registers perceptually and experientially)—the original individual’s dream. But
this is really to say that dreams are internal experiences, not private ones. And to take the
fact that the dream occurs for the individual and the individual alone and to deduce from
that some presumption that a dream, therefore, is something about which anyone other than
the dreamer can know absolutely nothing, is a profoundly wrongheaded mistake, but a
mistake, nonetheless, that is made over and over again.

II – Freud’s Method
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Freud gives voice to the frequency with which mistakes of the kind above are made
in thinking about dreaming, as well as to the mire of different discrete, not interrogated
presumptions that weave together to create a conception of dreams in which such mistakes
can be made, at the opening of Lecture V in his Introductory Lectures, doing so by presenting
and then questioning how it is that people actually do conceive of dreams. Freud opens this
line of inquiry by highlighting an interesting quality of dreams, one that has a great fidelity to
those qualities of language highlighted by Wittgenstein throughout his Philosophical
Investigations, and most emphatically during his decry against the concept of a private
language: dreaming, like language, is a ubiquitous experience, something which everyone,
save for very rare exceptions, knows intimately, and has engaged with throughout their lives.
Freud writes:
We must begin by finding our bearings in the task before us and
taking a general survey of the field of dreams. What, then, is a
dream? It is hard to answer in a single sentence. But we will not
attempt a definition when it is enough to point to something
familiar to everyone. We should, however, bring the essential
features of dreams into prominence. Where is that to be found,
though? There are such immense differences within the frame that
comprises our subject—differences in every direction. The essential
feature will presumably be something that we can point to as
common to all dreams (Freud 107).
By engaging at the outset with dreams in non-rigid terms3, namely by actually inspecting
both how dreams occur and how we think of dreams, Freud allows for a nuanced realm of
resemblances between drastically different dreams to float to the fore. Freud’s whole
opening to this section of his introductory investigation into dreams, as quoted above,
implies heavily the difficulty of taking an essentialist approach to investigating dream and
even the potential wrong-headedness of such a pursuit, going so far practically as to establish
3

The rigid case being, say, to create a confining definition that gives bracketed, and limiting
form to something with which everyone already has an intimate, comprehensive experience
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the whole “search for an essential feature” as being a guaranteed folly. Freud opts instead to
create a framework for this outset of his investigation of dreams and their interpretation that
allows for this kind of therapeutic interrogation of the phenomenon of dreaming through
contrasting what features we immediately think of as consistent across all dreams (and many
of these are necessary circumstances for dreaming to occur more than they are
characteristics of dreams themselves) with how those facets actually manifest within a dream
or impact upon a dream, where certain kinds of echoes or resemblances between different
dreams become prominent, and where the recognition of those resemblances provides the
actual insight into the field of dreams.
Freud’s method, here, like Wittgenstein’s approach to investigating language, takes a
therapeutic approach to addressing the issue of dreams. This is to say that the enterprise
occurring here in attempting to give form to dreaming as a phenomenon is one that hinges
upon unearthing from beneath our presumptions and from beneath supplied descriptions of
cases of our experiences the actual features of dreams, free from our own presumptions,
rationalizations, and misinterpretations of the matter. Wittgenstein, in interrogating instances
of particular language uses and certain utterances—some contrived and unnatural, some
intuitive and second-nature to how we conceive of all sorts of facets of experience and
existence—dispels long-perpetuated presumptions about all kinds of issues (both
philosophical and “practical,” personal and personally pertinent) and through engaging in
this kind of interplay between how we conceive of things and how we actually think, pulls
from beneath those clouding modes of thinking more nuanced and more actual facets of
how people engage with life, with the world, and with each other, ones which both hinge
upon and also utterly transform our sense of language. Freud, likewise, chooses to approach
the matter of dreaming here not by making pronouncements about dreams, but instead by
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trying to localize, inspect, and, through that inspection, unveil how dreams actually behave,
how they actually affect the dreamer, and what elements of dreams people hold to be most
tantamount, and to show what is evinced actually about dreams through those elements, and
to dispel misappraisals and miscomprehensions which rise to a position of relief through
such an interrogation. Now, this is not to say that the two approaches are markedly the same,
so much as it is to highlight that they have an affinity to one another, that Freud’s impulse to
for how to approach dreaming as an issue has a similarity to Wittgenstein’s impulse for how
to approach language.
But in doing so, Freud implies a certain alignment between the phenomenon of
dreaming and Wittgenstein’s conception of language, as the presentation of dreams
suggested here (namely that they likely lack a kind of common, defining quality bracketing
them all together into the category of dreaming, and that the potential cohesive classification
of individual dreams into the general bracket of dreams relies on relationships of affinity, not
identity, between different kinds of dreams) echoes heavily Wittgenstein’s discussion of
language during his presentation of the language game in Philosophical Investigations, and the
suggestion that dreams exist in relation to each other in terms of affinity practically mirrors
Wittgenstein’s argument for family resemblance.

III – Family Resemblance and Dreams

Wittgenstein’s model of language hinges upon the idea of the language-game, where
the meaning of a word and the terms on which a person speaks or employs language are
determined by the context in which it appears, and underlying rules and presumptions about
what can be expected from the individual in how they employ language given that certain
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context. From the language-game, which behaves very much like any other game, and which
can abound in an innumerable multiplicity of forms and variations, Wittgenstein builds out
his model for language, where one essential feature of language is not readily evident and
does not define language, but where language is made up of an array of distinct language
games that all have affinities between one another. Wittgenstein writes early into his
investigation into language:
Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all
these considerations.—For someone might object against me:
“You make things easy for yourself! You talk about all sorts of
language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a
language-game, and so to language: What is common to all these
activities, and makes them into language games or parts of language.
So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once
gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the
proposition and of language.”
And this is true.—instead of pointing out something common
to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have
no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word
for all—but there are many different kinds of affinity between them.
And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all
“languages”. I’ll try to explain this. (Wittgenstein p65)
It’s worth noting that Wittgenstein’s response to the suggested objection against his
approach to exploring language makes plain the similarity between his approach to language
and the exploration of dreaming into which Freud endeavors in his Introductory Lectures,
although this note is not made to overemphasize the similarity between the two pursuits, as
Freud’s exploration of dreams carries with it clear disjunctions from Wittgenstein’s pursuit
into language (which will be evident by this chapter’s close). Wittgenstein refrains from
gesturing towards one common and essential feature to a language-game, and therefore to all
language games not because of the difficulty that comes with locating such a feature, but
because such a feature does not exist. The presumption that language is defined by one
critical component that is shared across all cases is in and of itself a misleading one, one that
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stems from certain epistemological presumptions about the need for an essential from which
a conception and understanding of the phenomenon at play can be built.
The absence of such an essential feature to language, however, does not mean that
comparison between different language usages in distinct contexts or different modes of
language employed separately from one another becomes an impossibility. Likewise, working
without some one common feature across all cases or one essential quality for language does
not render it impossible to identify certain things as language usages or to engage with those
language usages in a manner that carries with it certain consistencies (although sensitivity is
always needed when engaging with language, or when speaking of language, sensitivity to the
language-game at play and to the particularities of that game). This is because of the affinities
to which Wittgenstein points between different language-games and language usages, where
certain facets of each individual game resemble those of other games, and where those
affinities interweave together the games at play into what we call language. Wittgenstein
highlights these kinds of affinities by drawing the reader to look (and he takes special care to
impel the reader to look, not to think, in their appraisal) at different kinds of games discretely,
writing:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on.
What is common to them all?—Don’t say: “They must have
something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but
look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you
look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but
similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat:
don’t think, but look!—Look, for example, at board-games, with
their various affinities. Now pass to card-games; here you find
many correspondences with the first group, but many common
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ballgames, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are
they all ‘entertaining’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or
is there always winning and losing, or competition between players?
Think of patience. In ball-games, there is winning and losing; but
when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this
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feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck,
and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis.
Think now of singing and dancing games; here we have the
element of entertainment, but how many other characteristic
features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many
other groups of games in the same way, can see how similarities
crop up and disappear.
And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in
the large and in the small (Wittgenstein p66).
Wittgenstein highlights here that while disjunctions between individual games exist, and
between categories of games, similarities abound across cases, where the network produced
by the interweaving of those different similarities between cases allow for the identification
of a broader category of games, and the delineation of sub-strata within that broader
category. No common quality rises up clearly as being shared between all of those distinct
cases of engagements that we call games, but definite similarities exist between cases, such
that it is sensible, even intuitive to class all of these different forms of rule-governed
activities into the broader category of games, since the “complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing” between cases allows for a person to notice affinities
between discrete cases that bleed into one another across the spectrum of games. This is not
to say that some strand made up of one common tendency links across all these different
iterations of games, but instead that a thread of interwoven similarities forms and appears
when a person looks at discrete cases of different kinds of games and expands their lens to
look at games in conjunction with one another. It is obvious here that such a model is meant
to be applied to language, where different discrete language games operate on rules distinct
from one another, and where no one shared feature is shared across all cases, but where
certain affinities are apparent between one language game and another, and those
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resemblances carry on across all cases (even if not all cases appear exactly alike, they likely
have a shared cousin.)
From here, Wittgenstein arrives at his conception of a “family resemblance” model
for language, writing:
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities
than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between
members of a family—build, features, colour of eyes, gait,
temperament, and so on and so forth—overlap and criss-cross in
the same way. –And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.
And likewise the kinds of numbers, for example, form a family.
Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it
has a—direct—affinity with several things that have hitherto been
called “numbers”; and this can be said to give it an indirect affinity
with other things that we also call “numbers”. And we extend our
concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre.
And the strength of the thread resides not in the fact that some one
fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many
fibres. (Wittgenstein p67)
Language, on the model Wittgenstein proposes here, operates then on resemblances, where
no definitive characteristic exists across all cases, but where certain likenesses between one
language-game and another make it possible for a person to recognize that both uses exist as
part of the broader whole of language, a sort of “family” of all different discrete language
games. Through his use of the example of numbers, Wittgenstein makes plain that one
particular number need not bear an immediate resemblance to all other things that we call
numbers to be considered such, but need only have an immediate affinity with some other
discrete numbers, which themselves share a more striking resemblance to other numbers
that are much further removed from the initial case, and which may not have an immediate
resemblance.
Think of a family with a long lineage here. It wouldn’t be fair, for example, to expect
a person to have an immediate resemblance, for example, to their great-great-great-uncle,
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since so many generations lie between the individual and their ancestor. But it wouldn’t
follow that because of the absence of some common feature between the distant relative and
their descendant, the two were not in fact related. And likewise, say the person has the same
shape of eye as their grandmother, and the same blue eye color, even though their nose and
their grandfather’s nose are quite distinct from one another. But in scrutinizing old family
photographs, dating back quite a long ways, you notice another relative with a nose very
much like the grandmother’s—practically the same. Say the photo is captioned with the
names of all the relatives, and in looking at the names of the people captured in the image,
you notice that the name that corresponds with the person who shares the grandfather’s, and
realize that individual to be the great-great-great-uncle. It would be evident, then, the strand
of relation between the person and the present and their somewhat distant relative, since,
even though no affinity appeared immediately between the two individuals, they each share
separate features common to one relative along the line. Wittgenstein conceives of language
on precisely this sort of model, as is made evident by the closing analogy to a thread linking
together all of those different discrete usages and instances that we consider to be language,
where the individual fibers vary in length, and do not all continue over the thread’s entire
length, but where, because one thread is interwoven with another that continues after the
first has ended, and which interweaves with yet more discrete fibers to form the whole, the
thread has continuity and forms one cohesive whole.
Freud’s noting of the abounding of differences in dreams abounding in all directions
taken in conjunction with his earlier acknowledgment of the ease with which an individual
can identify upon waking that what they experienced in sleep was a dream—something that
belies a clear intimacy and awareness of dreaming on some level—presents a kind of affinity
to Wittgenstein’s model for language here, and suggests a potential relationship between
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dreams much like that between language-games, where one distinct feature of dreaming need
not rise to the fore—indeed, need not exist—for us to be able to engage with the vast
network of different discrete dreams that together make up the whole of dreaming in a
manner that is substantive and from which insight can be gleaned into the phenomenon. But
there are clear disjunctions between dreaming and language—not necessarily an issue given
what Wittgenstein suggests about disjunctions between different discrete iterations of
language games from one another—although these divides absolutely inflect the manner in
which the two need to be investigated as elements of living, and the suggestion that dreams
might operate on a model similar to the Wittgensteinian conception of language is not meant
to suggest too strong a relationship between the two phenomena, or that the two are
patently dictated by rules of too close an affinity.
And the suggestion Freud makes here about dreaming is not meant to lead the reader
to believe that Freud’s approach to exploring the issue of dreaming is markedly the same as
Wittgenstein’s investigation of language, or that the two engagements with these distinct
phenomena have a close similarity to each other. Features of both the phenomena and the
investigations into them by the two authors have features that markedly distinguish one from
the other, and that frequently clash with each other, something that this exploration aims to
address in what capacity it can (both in relation to dreaming in language and to Freud’s and
Wittgenstein’s).4 But what’s striking here is the similarity in intuition between the two
authors, which this section is meant to note most pronouncedly. While it may not carry
4

Wittgenstein’s relationship to Freud is a complicated one; Wittgenstein dismissed Freud’s
contribution to philosophy and his laying the groundwork for the development of basically
all modern pursuits to the mind and to mental health (psychology, psycho-analysis,
psychotherapy, cognitive science, etc.) as being simply a change in terminology; But
Wittgenstein also remarked that he was “a disciple of Freud,” as is made evident by those
“therapeutic” elements of his approach to the philosophy of language, a feature that carries
across the entirety of Wittgenstein’s later body of work
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through fully in Freud’s writing on dreams, the fact that it is suggested here, and that it
resembles so closely Wittgenstein’s model of language, potentially belies something
profound about dreaming that problematizes any sort of essentializing definition that may be
proposed for the phenomenon5.

IV—Defining Dreaming

But from here Freud and Wittgenstein seem to depart form one another, with the
intuition about dreams Freud suggests in the previously quoted passage that Wittgenstein
follows through completely in relation to language being abandoned in favor of a return to a
search for a common feature across dreams in all their many different iterations. Freud
begins proposing and surveying the different things readily evident to be common across
cases of dreaming with potential to be the essential, defining factor to the phenomenon,
doing so largely as a means of actually delineating how dreams function in relation to those
contingent features that most invite an individual to assume they are indeed patent to
dreaming. Freud touches first upon sleep in relation to dreams, writing:
The first thing common to all dreams would seem to be, of course,
that we are asleep during them. Dreaming is evidently mental life
during sleep—something which has certain resemblances to waking
mental life but which, on the other hand, is distinguished from it by
large differences. This was, long ago, Aristotle’s definition. It may
be that there are still closer connections between dreams and sleep.
We can be woken by a dream; we very often have a dream when we
wake up spontaneously or if we are forcibly aroused from sleep.
Thus dreams seem to be an intermediate state between sleeping
and waking. So, our attention is turned to sleep. Well, then, what is
sleep? (Freud 107)
5

The issue of the language-game will be taken up again later on, and it is for this reason too
that this feature of Freud’s embark into the issue of dreaming has been highlighted here.
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What Freud suggests as the natural intuition the reader would have initially here, namely that,
because dreams occur while we are asleep, dreaming during sleep is the mental analogue to
thinking while awake, carries with it an important implication about dreaming that does not
go dispelled as Freud’s picture of the connection between sleep and dreams becomes more
complicated: dreaming is a facet of being alive, one which has an affinity to thinking while
awake. What the precise nature of that affinity is remains unclear here, as do the manners in
which the marked and apparent differences between thinking and dreaming as components
of life both inflect the senses we hold of the phenomena and belie the actual nuanced terms
on which the two separate components behave.
That is to say that, while dreaming may be an analogue to thinking, as Freud suggests
here, the two stand almost immediately as strikingly distinct from one another. Thinking
involves a much more immediate engagement with things external to the individual, with
reality, while dreaming seems wholly hermetical, occurring in a way that has no immediate
relation to anything outside of the dreamer, beyond maybe stimuli experienced by the
dreamer’s body during sleep—which do not manifest themselves immediately in dreams, and
instead are transmuted into new forms within the dream itself—and if some sort of
relationship does exist between a dream and the world, or between a dreamer and reality, the
connection between the two involves a far greater distance between the dream and the world
than between thought and reality. We can remember causal chains in our thoughts quite
clearly; in fact, the associations between one thought and another often appear quite clearly,
or actually pull together a line of thinking in such a way that we can recall it quite fully. In
remembering dreams, however, the connections from one sequence to another often
disappear, or if they are retained, they appear to us in our recollection in such a manner
where they hardly seem sensible as following from one another, where no immediate strand
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of connection presents itself from one sequence to the next, and must be excavated after the
fact not through recollection but through mediation through language of the experience to
another, someone who interprets. Additionally, we don’t often speak of interpretation when
we talk about thinking (at least, we don’t talk about interpreting thinking, so much as we do
the interpretation of the presentation of thinking through language; instead, we usually talk
of interpretation as a form of thought, as something which people do when thinking about
facets of their experience of which they are trying to make sense)6, whereas dreaming and
interpretation practically go hand-in-hand (indeed, Freud’s major work, and the writing with
which this paper is engaged, solidifies the relationship between the two, extolls the need for
interpretation of a dream for an understanding of that dream’s significance to be reached,
and for a meaning in that dream to be found). And these are just a few of the many striking
distinctions between dreaming and waking life. Freud even speaks to this matter, saying that:
“In short, this fragment of mental activity during the night has an immense repertory at its
disposal; it is capable, in fact, of all that the mind creates in daytime—yet it is never the same
thing” (Freud 111). Freud’s closing line here too reaffirms the possibility for dreaming to be
understood in similar terms to language, where the family-resemblance proposal allows for a
potential rectification of the issue of dreams being something easily recognizable to the
individual but never repeating themselves, never unveiling in how they are experienced some
central and essential quality, but always suggesting certain affinities between each other.
But this suggestion as to how dreams should be understood, that they should be
conceived of indeed as an analogue to a person’s experience when they are awake that serves
a kind of function, stands quite against the estimation of dreams forwarded by other thinkers
concerned with the issue of dreaming who produced scholarship contemporaneously with
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Freud. These other works of scholarship on dreams, Freud qualifies, concern themselves
chiefly with delineating dreaming from thinking, doing so in a way where the potential for
disjunction, the fractured coherence, and the generally choppy and murky nature of dreams
are treated not as being valuable and important facets of dreaming that supply it with
definition as a phenomenon and distinguish it as separate from waking thought, but instead as
indications of the diminished value of dreaming, the inferiority of dreams in comparison to
what is more typically considered thinking. Freud qualifies this whole ‘in-vogue’ (at the time)
estimation of dreaming with an old parlance, writing: “According to an old analogy, the
contents of a dream are like the sounds produced when ‘the ten fingers of a man who knows
nothing of music wander over the keys of a piano’” (Freud 106). Such an estimation doesn’t
necessarily refute that dreams are themselves a form of thinking, but it does imply explicitly
a level of such extreme discordance between those different images and sounds that appear
to the dreamer in a state of sleep as to make dreams seem wholly incoherent, random,
thoughtless, and indecipherable. And what’s more, the analogy about the non-musical man
and the piano renders interpretation of a dream impossible and suggests such a venture to be
wholly fruitless, since it implies that a dream is not the kind of thing that can have a sense to it,
let alone a meaning, as the actions of the man striking randomly against the piano are actions
that are patently senseless7.
And while Freud does not refute the extreme degree of ambiguity that can arise from
the disorganized assemblage of different sights, sounds, and experiences that, pasted
together, constitute a dream, he also does not accept this kind of model, where a dream is
7

An aside: an analogue to this kind of “dream,” if it is indeed a possible one, within language
would be Chomsky’s famous example of a syntactically and grammatically exemplary yet
semantically nonsensical sentence: ‘colorless green ideas sleep furiously’. This kind of
language usage, and what is belied about how comprehensibility operates within language,
will be taken back up in relation to comprehensibility in dreaming.
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just purely a slapdash combination of unassociated abstractions and trappings of the
everyday re-contextualized purely accidentally. This becomes more evident as Freud works
clearly to delineate that while dreams and sleep have a relationship to one another, a dream
itself cannot purely be a facet of sleep, and that the relationship suggested above, that the
dream is simply mental life during sleep, is one that is reductive, and that actually obscures
many actual qualities of the dream from the individual concerned with understanding it.
Freud writes of sleep that:
Sleep is a state in which I want to know nothing of the external
world, in which I have taken my interest away from it. I put myself
to sleep by withdrawing from the external world and keeping its
stimuli away from me. I also go to sleep when I am fatigued by it.
So when I go to sleep I say to the external world: ‘leave me in
peace: I want to go to sleep.’ On the contrary, children say, ‘I’m not
going to sleep yet; I’m not tired, and I want to have some more
experiences.’ The biological purpose of sleep seems therefore to be
rehabilitation, and its psychological characteristic suspense of
interest in the world. Our relationship to the world, into which we
have come so unwillingly, seems to involve our not being able to
tolerate it uninterruptedly (Freud 108).
Freud’s closing sentence here is a particularly striking one, since, while his description of
sleep is clearly one that clashes with the notion that dreams are purely mental life in sleep,
since, given the suggested function of sleep is to rejuvenate the body and mind, and allow
for a total escape, a total exit from the world, and given that dreams are not total respite, not
total null over the mind, this closing remark leaves room for that something about dreams
may as a kind of intermission from our waking life, one that stems from our inability to
engage with and process the world consistently without diversion of attention.
Freud continues later on the page, writing:
If this is what sleep is, dreams cannot possibly form part of its
programme, but seem on the contrary to be an unwelcome addition
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to it. In our opinion too, a dreamless sleep is the best, the only
proper one. There ought to be no mental activity in sleep’ if it
begins to stir, we have not succeeded in establishing the foetal state
of rest: we have not been able entirely to avoid residues of mental
activity. Dreaming would consist in these residues. But if so, it
would really seem that there is no need for dreams to have any
sense (Freud 109).
This full recognition of the fundamental tension between the description of sleep supplied
earlier, where sleep is purely rest, a window where the mind is totally quiet, and the dream,
which, regardless of what it may be, is not something silent by any stretch of the imagination,
suggests that the analysis supplied so far in this description of Freud has no bearing on the
text itself. This rings especially true of the closing remark here, where Freud stipulates that,
in the case that indeed dreaming is purely the residues of mental activity, trickling across the
mind of the dreamer as they sleep, there is no need at all for a dream to be something
substantive, something with sense. But an issue arises quickly here, one which belies Freud’s
actual commitment to the significance of dreams, to their value as a phenomenon of living:
even in the case that dreams are purely an auxiliary function of the mind, they are still a
phenomenon, and for that phenomenon to be explicable, some sort of sense to the
phenomenon is required. And there is no reason, as Freud has qualified dreams so far, that
dreaming would be something devoid of explanation.
Freud first touches upon the possibility for dreams to be cases of the mind
responding to stimuli from the exterior world impinging upon the body during a sleeping
state, suggesting that this may indeed be the source of dreams as a phenomenon. But quickly,
Freud problematizes this conception by describing three different cases of dreams in which a
external stimulus impinges into the dream, but instead of impacting upon the dream directly,
is transformed into being an element of the dream occurring in the moment, where the
stimulus is transmuted and reshaped by the dreamer such that it is integrated into the dream
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itself in a way that bears little resemblance to how it effects the dreamer’s body while they
sleep. Freud writes of this case that:
Let us notice, however, one peculiarity of dream-life which comes
to light in this study of the effects of stimuli. Dreams do not simply
reproduce the stimulus; they work it over, they make allusions to it,
they include it in some context, they replace it by something else.
This is a side of the dream-work which is bound to interest us since
it may perhaps bring us nearer to the essence of dreams. When a
person constructs something as a result of a stimulus, the stimulus
need not on that account exhaust the whole of the work….it may
be that the external and internal stimuli…impinging on the sleeper,
are only the instigators of the dream and will accordingly betray
nothing to us of its essence (Freud 117-118).
The transformation of the stimulus impinging upon the body here makes plain that an
external stimulus cannot be the source of the dream, although it may instigate the dream that
occurs. But all of the cases that Freud describes where an external stimulus invades into the
dream and is transformed into a facet of the dream, one that echoes the stimulus effecting
the dreamer’s body, but which is wholly distinct from the actual source of the impinging
stimulus, in this case an alarm-clock sounding, begin before the transmuted version of the
stimulus appears in the dream. And this suggests that those stimuli are not in fact the
instigator of the dream, as Freud suggests here, or the initiator of the dream-content that the
dreamer experiences. Instead, they seem only to be incidental facets of the dream itself,
things altered by the dreamer in an order indiscernible and seemingly without intention,
where the transmutation serves an indeterminable function. And this leads to the major
revelation that Freud makes at the close of this quoted section, namely that the possibility
for an imposing stimulus in the world in which the dreamer engages while they are awake to
enter into a dream in some form or another does nothing to make evident a greater
essence—maybe more aptly an explanation—for the dream itself, and that the ability for an
external stimulus to be transformed into a feature of the dream suggests little about
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dreaming beyond that the sense of the individual are still at play while they sleep, while they
dream—even if those sense are overtaken by the dream itself, which appears to the dreamer
as being real in the moment.
Freud moves quickly, however, to positing another, more intangible facet of dreams
common to the experience generally: namely the difficulty for description, or to use Freud’s
own parlance, ‘translation,’ of a dream as an experience to another. Freud writes that:
Mental processes in sleep have a quite different character than
those of waking life. We experience every sort of thing in dreams
and believe in it, whereas nevertheless we experience nothing,
except, perhaps, the single disturbing stimulus. We experience it
predominantly in visual images; feelings may be present too, and
thoughts interwoven in it as well; the other sense may also
experience something, but nonetheless it is predominantly a
question of images. Part of the difficulty of giving an account of
dreams is due to our having to translate these images into words. ‘I
could draw it’, a dreamer often says to us, ‘but I don’t know how to
say it’. This is not, however, a reduced mental activity, like that of a
feeble-minded person as compared to that of a genius: it is
qualitatively different, though it is hard to say where the difference
lies (Freud 110).
This matter is one to which, while it proves especially challenging to explore substantively
and which proves somewhat mystifying as a quality of the experience of dreaming, most
people would likely point early into a discussion of the matter of dreaming as a patent
element of the experience. But what’s more, the difficulty in “translation” of the imagery and
visual composite factors of any given dream into comprehensible, sensible, communicative,
and maybe most importantly substantive terms such that another person can find the
experience of the individual’s dream at least somewhat comprehensible, enough to attempt
interpretation of such a dream, is not a challenge wholly unique to dreaming. And Freud’s
suggestion that one of the defining characteristics of a dream here, namely both the visual
component of dreaming and the difficulty created by both the need for the dreamer to
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appraise the images that they see (and which they are also generating) and then to employ
language in such a manner to make that appraisal of the imagery (and by that I do not mean
the uncovering of whatever underlying psychological concerns may be associated with the
images seen while dreaming for that individual) comprehensible through language to another,
excavates one of those most complicated features of dreaming, and one of those features
that most intersects with issues in language: issues of meaning interpretation as related to
image appraisal and seeing.
But Freud becomes much more interested in the relationship between dreaming and
memory, touching on the patently visual quality of dreaming only briefly here and once more
before closing out Chapter V and moving on to proposing a model for dream interpretation.
Freud barely explores the complexity of seeing, and of the relationship between an image
and the viewer in a totally minimal capacity, treating the matter almost as being one that
requires no explanation, or for which explanation cannot be given, or where the manner in
which a person looks at an image and appraises it or engages with it during their waking life
is on its own wholly uncomplicated, and where any complexity that stems from dreams
consisting primarily in self-generated visual imagery that appears to the viewer while they
sleep as being real is a result of the imagery being patently unreal, created by the mind during
sleep and therefore not of the order of visual images we encounter while we are awake.
Instead, Freud chooses to proceed in trying to elevate to a relief the meaning that underlies a
dream, writing: “It only shows that we have come upon a new task. We not only want to
know what a dream says, but, if it speaks clearly…” (Freud 119). The connection drawn
between a dream and language, where the dream is an attempt by the individual to
communicate something to the individual (indeed is communicating, as if it has an agency of its
own; something no doubt done to make plain the manner in which the dream is dictated by
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the unconscious, by those concerns of the individual to which they themselves are not
cognizant, but which do affect them and which play a role in how they conceive of the world
and how they operate within it) something of which they otherwise would not be cognizant,
begins the shift over to Freud’s exploration of the matter of interpretation.
If indeed, a dream communicates things like language does, then it makes sense to
treat the relaying of a dream, although it consists chiefly in visual phenomena, through
language to another, and to have that other mediate over the relaying through language of
the dreamt experience and glean from that presentation some underlying concern—the thing
that the dream is communicating, is thrusting to the surface—as being unproblematic. And it
makes sense too here for Freud to place primacy on a relationship between dreaming and
memory, as, for Freud, the possibility for interpretation relies heavily on a conception of
each facet of a dream—each discrete visual stimulus or experiential component—being
linked explicitly and inextricably to a particular feature of a person’s experience life, although
to what the dreamt feature corresponds may not be evident. Of this, Freud writes:
If then things that occur to one quite freely….form parts of a
connected whole, we shall no doubt be justified in concluding that
things that occur to one with a single link—namely their link with
the idea which serves as their starting-point—cannot be any less
determined. Investigation shows, in fact, that, apart from the link
we have given them with the initial idea, they are found to be
dependent as well on groups of strongly emotional thoughts and
interests, ‘complexes’, whose participation is not known at the
moment—that is to say, is unconscious (Freud 133).
From this quote, where Freud suggests that these links bring to the fore ‘complexes’ of
underlying emotional and biographical concerns and after-effects of lived experience that
inflect how an individual engages with the world, and which relate heavily to their identity, to
their temperament, and that these are unconscious (indeed, this may be the unconscious at
play), and that through the process of free association, an individual is able to excavate these
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complexes and come to understand those things underlying their life, and which are
responsible for a dream behaving in the manner that it does, and which are responsible for
the features of the individual’s dream being interpreted. Freud says as much, writing:
In dreams the stimulus-world is replaced by something that is itself
derived form the dreamer’s mental life, from sources unknown to
him, and may therefore very easily itself be a ‘derivative of a
complex’. It is therefore not precisely fantastic to suppose that the
further associations linked to the dream-elements will be
determined by the same complex as that of the element itself and
will lead to its discovery. (Freud 134-135)
What becomes critical, then, in understanding a dream, in gleaning from it a sense or a
meaning, is uncovering whatever the complex is that rests underneath those manifestations
of the unconscious complex that appear in sleep as being real, as being visual and sensory
and experienced.
To understand a dream, then, a dreamer must, through guidance by another,
presumably a psychoanalyst or a therapist, recall from their memory those experiences that
mirror the things that appeared in dreaming, that manifested themselves as being real and
sensory while the dreamer slept, and through interpretation of those images in relation to
those recollections, arrive at the complex underlying the dream, thereby lifting it out of the
unconscious and making it possible to neutralize its power over the individual. What’s
striking here is the primacy placed on memory, on recollection here, and the diminishment
of the fact that dreams register as experience to the dreamer in the moment. Based on this
conception, the manner in which a dream registers as something real is treated as being
simply something deleterious, something that deceives the dreamer while they sleep, but that
ceases to be relevant as a concern after they have woken. Freud’s suggestion in the first
sentence of this passage that the complex, a facet of the dreamer’s ‘mental life,’ overtakes the
dreamer’s waking life while they dream and enshrouds them in the moment belies this point,
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and also makes plain the degree to which recollection takes primacy here. Freud’s initial
proposal for how interpretation functions, where he draws an analogy between free
association as a process for recalling a forgotten name and the kind of engagement that an
individual must undergo with their psychiatrist to excavate from their dream the underlying
concerns of the unconscious makes all but concrete how strongly he sees dreams and their
sense as being connected to memory, and the element of the dreamer’s mental life to which
Freud is no doubt alluding in the above passage is no doubt a memory, or memory generally.
Indeed, Freud finally identifies the essence of dreams as being the memory that
remains with the dreamer, the impression that they leave on the individual after they have
woken and returned to their waking life (Freud 130-136). The dream itself, while it is
occurring to the individual, ceases to be relevant to Freud, and the fact that the dream strikes
the individual as being real ceases to be of concern, instead becoming a kind of diversion or
red herring that further deceives the individual, and which, unless it is dismissed in some
capacity, makes giving dreams explanation and elevating them to a position of actual
significance as a part of living an impossibility. How the dreamer recalls particular moments or
discrete elements of their dream as experiential remains of concern, sure, as those
particularities may aid in the process of interpretation, but the fact that dreams across cases
register experientially—as lived experience—while they occur to the individual is left
unexplored, practically dropping out of Freud’s discussion in the Introductory Lectures beyond
some recognitions of its novelty. This is in part due to the fact that no record of the dream
exists beyond the memory of the dream for the dreamer, and that the dream itself did not
happen, at least in the terms that we conceive of experiences. This issue is one for which
Wittgenstein’s proposals about sensation offer a rectification, but given Freud’s pursuit, the
matter appears not to be relevant, and cannot be rectified in a manner where the kind of
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interpretation proposed can be pursued. The dream, for Freud, is the memory with which
the dreamer is left, and the dream’s meaning, its sense, is to be found in comparing that
memory with the memories of the dreamer’s lived experience in reality. Appraising the
dream relies on uncovering the unconscious complex underlying it, which, on this model, is
chiefly responsible for the dream’s occurrence, and is the thing to which the dream gestures,
which the dreamer can only realize through their exploration through recollection.
But this does not rectify a patent quality of dreaming which Freud identifies as being
consistent and striking about dreams, and which proves to be one of the qualities that makes
the relaying of the dream most challenging: that dreams appear primarily in visual terms
when they occur. And likewise, defining the dream as the memory of the dream and nothing
more seems to render much of Freud’s exploration into the phenomenon of dreaming, and
likewise untouched much about how we see images, and about the complicated interplays
between seeing, thinking, experience, and language.
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Seeing

I—Reconsidering the Visual Component

Before closing Lecture V of his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud makes one
final note about dreams occurring largely in visual terms, where he qualifies the appearance
of dreams as visual imagery as being both one of the most unusual components of dreamt
experience, and also one of the least immediately explicable. Of the matter, Freud writes:

The second thing that is common to dreams, their psychical
peculiarity, is on the one hand hard to grasp and on the other offers
us no starting-point for further enquiry. We experience things in
dreams as a rule in visual forms. Can the stimuli throw any light on
this? Is what we experience in fact the stimulus? But, if so, why is
the experience visual, while it is only in the rarest cases that optical
stimulation has instigated the dream?…I venture to dismiss that
possibility decisively (Freud 118)
Here, Freud again notes how dreams consist largely of visual imagery as being a
patent quality of dreaming, but treats this quality of dreaming, one with which we all have a
breadth of intimate experience—something we’ve all noticed about our dreams—as being
inexplicable, and likewise irrelevant to the matter of arriving at a comprehensive
understanding of what dreams are and how they behave. Because no explanation for
dreaming occurring in visual terms appears as immediately apparent thus far in the pursuit
(no doubt later Freud would attribute the visual component of dreams to the influence of
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memory on the fixtures that appear in dream, explain this element as being a byproduct of
our dreams being fashioned from memories of waking reality, our experience of which
consists largely of visual imagery), and because the manifestation of dreams as visual does
not seem to bely anything about the essence of dreams to Freud, and does not gesture towards
some element of how dreams function to make evident concerns of ours that we would not
otherwise notice, based on Freud’s underlying area of interest, this component is not treated
as being relevant in substantive or significant terms to the investigation of dreaming, at least
not in a manner where the visual elements of dreams are treated on their own terms, or
where the engagement by the viewer with dreamt imagery actually complicates how the
matter of dream interpretation is conceived. And in addition, Freud does not account for, or
even acknowledge, the nuances, ambiguities, and complications of visual engagement and
image appraisal in waking life when talking about the relationship between dreams and lived
experience; indeed, no acknowledgment is made about how the process of image appraisal in
waking life inflects how we think about memories and how we ascertain from things seen
over the course of our lives senses of those images, or make identifications of things in the
world based on how we see them.

II—Two Modes of Seeing

The issue of image appraisal already carries with it challenges, ones that relate to
issues of meaning containment and relaying within language, and which grow ever more
complicated as they become factored into consideration in relation to language usages where
those ascriptions of judgment or those assessments of images come into play. Wittgenstein
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addresses precisely these issues of seeing in Part II, Section xi of his Philosophical Investigations,
which he opens with a revelation both strikingly terse and stupefying in its expansiveness:
Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?”—“I see this” (and then a
description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these
two faces”—let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as
clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorical difference between the two
‘objects’ of sight (Wittgenstein PII p111).
To suggest that something as complicated as seeing occurs along only two different byways
might strike some as being reductive, as bracketing off a whole range of different kinds of
experiences of seeing into two quite narrow categories. But such an estimation of
Wittgenstein’s model would require treating these two modes of seeing as being
straightforward, rigid in their operation, would require actually looking at these two
proposed distinct modes of seeing in simplistic terms. For seeing these two modes of seeing
as being uncomplicated in how they find themselves at play when a person looks at an image
assumes that the kind of mode of seeing with which an individual is engaged when observing
something in front of them to be readily evident, both to the individual looking on at the
image and to the person to whom the ‘seeing’ that is done is relayed. In actuality, what kind
of seeing is occurring is rarely readily apparent or even taken into consideration by the
viewer, even when language use around visual experience comes into play. What’s more, to
treat these two modes of seeing as being reductive, as failing to account for a whole range of
different kinds of visual experiences and identifications within images, requires fully ignoring
the proposal Wittgenstein makes that these two modes of seeing occur because of the
‘categorial difference’ between what an individual is actually seeing in one case, in the case of
‘seeing,’ and what they are seeing in the other, in the case of ‘seeing as.’
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Wittgenstein emphasizes this categorical distinction between what is being seen in
the premise that directly follows this one, writing “the one man might make an accurate
drawing of the two faces, and the other notice in the drawing the likeness which the former
did not see. (Wittgenstein PII Sxi p112.)” This proposal, where the first man notices the two
faces, and through his observation is able accurately to reproduce their likenesses in
drawings, requires that the individual then observe the faces he saw and accurately appraise
them, therefore making the faces and their details the object of sight. In the second case,
where the other man looks at the drawn faces (or even the two faces of the people drawn),
and notices between them certain resemblances and similarities in features, requires that the
individual then observe the likenesses between the two faces, noticing their closeness in
appearance between the two.
This is not to say that the image being looked at by the two individuals is a different
image in each case; but it is to say that what is being seen is markedly different, since in the
one case, the person is observing the image simply as it is, in a context mostly bracketed by
where it appears, but not heavily inflected by that, while in the other case, the person is
observing the likenesses between the image and another, interpreting what they see in the
two different faces, and noticing details in one in the light of another, where certain features
of one image register in a particular manner based on how they compare to the other image.
This kind of proposal, then, carries with it a suggestion that in one case, a person is seeing a
thing as it is, and in the other, they are seeing something as connected to another visual
trapping of the world encountered previously, either in a completely separate context or in a
closely interconnected one. How such a thing occurs, Wittgenstein argues later, is not
necessarily a matter of choice, and does not necessarily carry with it the implication that one
mode of observation is more accurate than the other, since in both cases the individuals are
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noticing aspects of the thing at which they are looking, the different objects of vision being
each separate aspects of the thing in the world.
Implicit in this presentation so far is the idea that, when a person sees in this kind of
way, they may do so selectively, choosing explicitly to look at a thing in a bracketed context,
and then taking in its physical qualities all on their own, or selecting instead to see it through
the light of something else, through a kind of applied lens, where what is observed relies
heavily on that lens, as it has been selected by the individual. In truth, these modes of seeing
are not mutually exclusive, in that a single person can see something in one instance and
then see that same thing as when they encounter the same image in a different context, or
with a different set of concerns. Likewise, a person can see something perceptually, see
something in the first manner proposed, and register what they see differently in those cases,
depending on vantage point, or position, or context. Through the multiple modes of seeing,
then, a person gains a greater awareness of the object, they notice a new aspect of it and
through that observation and ascription come to see the thing in a wholly new light.
Wittgenstein quickly eschews a concern with whatever causal explanation exists for
how these modes of seeing occur mentally for the individual (which does not put to bed a
certain problem of projection 8 in relation to images, but which sets aside the issue of
delineating a causal explanation for the issue) by qualifying that the causality of such a
phenomenon is of concern to psychologist, while “we are interested in the concept and its
place among the concepts of experience (Wittgenstein pII sxi p115.).” This is to say that
Wittgenstein’s exploration is concerned with seeing as it occurs immediately, as it occurs
under typical circumstances when an individual looks at an image and gleans from that image
8

Where the viewer’s projects onto an image qualities that are not actually manifested visually
within the image itself. This is contrasted with perception, where the viewer notices the
image perceptually, their impression of the image therefore being a perceptual impression
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a certain awareness or understanding of the image itself or of the image in a certain light.
Wittgenstein begins this exploration of the actual act of seeing by supplying the reader with a
two-dimensional drawing of a three dimensional rectangular prism, the kind found typically
in elementary school math textbooks or in introductory guides to drawing with aspect and
dimension. Wittgenstein writes of about the image:
One could imagine the illustration appearing in several places in a
book, a textbook for instance. In the accompanying text,
something different is in question every time: Here a glass cube,
there an upturned open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there
three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the
interpretation of the illustration.
But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as
another.—So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.
(Wittgenstein pII sxi p116)
What proves especially revelatory here is Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the act of
interpretation of the image, where the image is seen by the individual in a particular manner
inflected by how it is that they are looking at the thing (what kind of three-dimensional
image they are searching for in the two-dimensional drawing, or what kind of frame of
reference they have for ascribing a particular kind of visual identification to the image) and
registers immediately as a visual image to that individual based on that inflection. A person
can see a two-dimensional drawing and interpret that drawing as being a glass square, or an
open box, or a wire frame with no sides, and that interpretation carries with it an immediate
act of seeing the square as being that thing, where the interpretation and the seeing happen
almost in unison with one another. What’s more, a person likely has a natural inclination as
to how that particular two-dimensional drawing registers to them, (say, you are especially
inclined to see the two-dimensional drawing as being a plinth for an art installation), and in
looking at the drawing, that inclination leads them to see the image immediately as that
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plinth, without registering that what they are doing involves interpretation, and without
deliberating over how the image is to be appraised.

III—Where Perception Ends and Interpretation Begins

Wittgenstein’s two closing sentences in this posit, which most overtly address this
quality of seeing, suggest an immediate connection between seeing and interpretation in
cases of seeing as of precisely the manner that is described above in relation to taking the twodimensional drawing to be a plinth. But what exactly they suggest about this phenomenon
becomes somewhat unclear. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s closing sentence makes plain
that a person can interpret what it is that they are seeing through a particular substrate of
different individual and contextual concerns, and then see the object through the lens of the
interpretation they’ve supplied to it, therefore creating a kind of fidelity between the
interpretation of the object within a context and a seeing of the object as a certain thing. But
there is also the possibility, given the actual wording of Wittgenstein’s statement that “we
interpret it, and see it as we interpret it,” and given the suggestion made above, that a person
may have a particular inclination immediately as to how they see the two-dimensional
drawing and lend to it three-dimensional depth, that in cases of seeing as, interpretation can
happen almost concurrently with the observation of the image, such that the viewer does not
register that they are interpreting.
But what remains especially unclear so far is the point at which perception ends and
interpretation begins. Presumably the answer lies between the first case of seeing that
Wittgenstein proposes, where a person sees a thing for what it is, seemingly, and the second
case, where a person sees something as connected to a set of visual qualities of the image,
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but which are not themselves visually manifested or articulated by the image. The distinction
between perception and interpretation, then, lies between “is” and “as.” But in the case of
dreaming, where seeing an image for what it is seems to be an impossibility, given that
‘seeing’ in dreaming is quite different from seeing in waking life, since a person is not
observing something real when they “see” an image in a dream. This seems to stem from an
inapplicability of the concept of seeing, as it’s being investigate here, to the images that
appear to a person while they dream, since the concepts of seeing when waking and “seeing”
when dreaming seem incongruous to one another. But, as has already been noted in our
establishing of dreams during the previous chapter, those features that constitute a dream—
indeed the dream itself—registers to the dreamer while it unfolds for them in sleep as
“real, ”as actually experienced. And in the moment where a person “sees” an image in a
dream, they take it to be the same experience as seeing in waking life. Likewise, given Freud’s
proposals about dreams, interpretation is essential to gripping an identification of those
concerns inflecting and underlying the particular visual trappings of a dream, but
interpretation relies heavily on mediation by another. Because dreaming relies on looking at
visual imagery that is unreal, that does not exist in a capacity where it can actually be
observed by the viewer, but where instead it is generated by the dreamer, who in the dream
assumes the role of the viewer, perception seems to vanish as a possibility, and instead,
seeing an image in a dream seems to rely wholly on interpretation; but the seeing that occurs
in a dream still registers to the dreamer like perception; the dreamer even describes what they
see in perceptual terms. This dissonance between what kind of “seeing” is occurring and
how that “seeing” registers to the dreamer, at odds with Freud’s estimation, holds the
potential to shed immense insight on dreams, and on waking life as well. And this issue is
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one that is tantamount to this exploration of Freud’s writing on dreaming in relation to
Wittgenstein’s investigation of seeing.

IV—How Modes of Seeing Manifest in Language

Wittgenstein moves from here to discussing how cases of the second form of seeing
introduced at the start of Section XI manifest themselves in language uses, as a means in part
of compounding the idea that seeing as is not some deliberated-upon choice to interpret an
image a particular way, but is in fact as immediate a process as seeing the thing generally.
Wittgenstein begins this investigation of the matter by couching a potential intuition a reader
might have following what appears previously on the page, writing:
Here, perhaps one would like to respond: the description of
immediate, visual experience by means of an interpretation is an
indirect description. “I see the figure as a box” amounts to: I have a
particular visual experience which is empirically found to
accompany interpreting the figure as a box, or looking at a box. But
if it amounted to this, I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer
to the experience directly, and not only indirectly. (As I can speak
of red without necessarily calling it the colour of blood.)
(Wittgenstein PII SXI p118)
If, indeed, describing their immediate visual experience of looking at a 2-dimensional
drawing of a rectangle through an interpretive utterance like “I see it as a box” qualifies as an
indirect description, as what Wittgenstein suggests an individual might wish to say of this
sort of case, then likewise it should be possible for the immediate visual experience to be
described directly as well. The issue, in this case, stems from the idea that what ‘accompanies’
(as it is termed in the elaborated-upon description Wittgenstein couches as being that
preferred by this potential intuition) seeing the image as a box, or interpreting the seen 2-
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dimensional image to be a box, is an ‘immediate, visual experience.’ For the image to be
interpreted, as is being suggested here, then it means that thought must be at play in tandem
with the perception of the image, such that a person can orient what it is they see in such a
manner that they can schematize the lines presented to have a similarity in appearance to a
box. And so saying “I see the figure as a box,” is not an indirect description of an immediate
visual experience that is wed to interpreting the image to be a box, but instead an articulation
of seeing where interpretation and perception intermingle. But likewise, while a person a
may well say that they “see this figure as a box,” they can just as easily say “I see a box,”
which would give voice to an identification of a box in their visual appraisal of the image,
and the interchangeability of these two phrases in conversation, even if their meanings may
be slightly different, belies that the act of ‘seeing as,’ where interpretation ‘saturates’
perception, is not one done deliberately (at least not in the conventional sense), and instead
occurs with an immediacy, the kind that would keep a person from even registering that the
process in which they are engaging is one of interpretation. Such a lens would only be
applied after the fact, or would only be applicable in a case where the individual forced
themself to ‘see as’.

V- The Duck-Rabbit

The famous case of the duck-rabbit only further reveals the complicated relationship
between perception and interpretation, between seeing and seeing as, something which
Wittgenstein makes evident quickly simply in describing the drawing. In introducing the
duck-rabbit figure, Wittgenstein writes:
In my remarks, the following figure, derived from Jastrow, will be
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called “the duck-rabbit”/ It can be seen as a rabbit’s head or as a
duck’s. And I must distinguish between the
‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect and an aspect’s ‘lighting up’.
The picture might have been shown me, without my ever seeing in
it anything but a rabbit. (Wittgenstein PII SXI p118)
Wittgenstein’s closing sentence here, which makes note of the fact that, if somebody were to
be unaware of the possibility of the duck-rabbit being seen as either a duck’s head or a
rabbit’s head, they could potentially see the drawing as a rabbit without ever going over to
seeing the thing in a different light. What’s more, in this case, seeing the drawing in the first
sense, where the appraisal of the image made by the individual is a purely perceptual one, is
an impossibility, since the image itself is designed to be assessed as being one of two things,
not as a representation of one singular image. So in the case of the duck-rabbit, any act of
seeing is an act of seeing as, although evidently, the interpretation of the image that goes
along with such seeing does not register to an individual looking at the image overtly.
Indeed, for Wittgenstein’s final sentence in this posit to be true, a person would
have to see the duck-rabbit drawing as a rabbit, without immediately being cognizant of the
fact that they’ve only managed to see it that way because of how they’ve interpreted the
picture. To the onlooker, the thing registers as either a duck or a rabbit, and that ascription
to the image of its representing one or the other feels like something happening immediately,
not something relying on the mind’s assessing the visual image in a particular manner and
identifying within it one thing or the other. This only make plain that seeing as, while it relies
on an interpretive component, isn’t something that is necessarily deliberate. This quality of
the duck-rabbit carries with it a striking similarity to how a person registers a visual facet of a
dream, which, though it is self-generated, something produced by the individual for
themselves, the dreamer takes their impression of it to be perceptual, identifying their
“looking” at it within their dream and registering it to be a certain thing as being perceptual.
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Sure, if Wittgenstein, as he introduces himself in that last hypothetical, might have
been told that the picture shown to him can be seen as a duck’s head or as a rabbit’s head, he
may identify in the image one of the two animal’s likenesses (the one to which, for some
reason, he is more naturally inclined to notice), and then, knowing that the image can be
seen another way, force himself to identify in the image the other animal’s likeness. But he
does not need to deliberate arduously in the first place to see in the duck-rabbit drawing the
rabbit’s likeness. He does not need to say to himself “now I must interpret this image in
such an such a manner so that from it I can see a rabbit’s head.” The act of interpretation
involved in seeing the rabbit in the first place is much more unconscious, much more
second-nature.
Likewise, the dreamer interprets the dream image (which again, is unlike the duckrabbit, or is unlike an object or fixture that exists external to the viewer and which the viewer
through their looking at the thing appearing visually then registers in a particular manner
where perceptual seeing is possible, since the dreamer sees some underlying concern of
theirs as the physical fixture they’ve created and made manifest within their dream), but in a
somewhat roundabout manner, where their interpretation results in their seeing as registering
as perceptual seeing, where their visual appraisal registers like perception, like visual
experience. The interpretation of images in dreams that a viewer undergoes once they’ve
returned to the waking world, and are engaged in relaying what they saw to another, who
mediates their description and guides them through unearthing those concerns that the
image they produced in their dream articulates, must go through a kind of inverse of the
typical process around seeing, where to arrive at an accurate appraisal of the image in terms
of what it conveys, they must shift from “seeing” the image perceptually to “seeing” the
image as the underlying concern that caused it to manifest.
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Wittgenstein’s distinguishing between the continuous seeing of an aspect and the
aspect’s lighting-up, if it were, where the manner in which the person sees the thing at which
they are looking suddenly transforms, and a kind of epiphanic new mode of seeing the
object appears suddenly, suggests too an important quality of seeing: that a new aspect can
be seen of an object, or an object can be noticed in a new light, but that such seeing happens
suddenly, and is transitional in such a manner where the old way of seeing disappears during
the window in which the object is seen anew. A person, then, can see the duck-rabbit as a
duck or as a rabbit, and while the shift from seeing the image as one thing to seeing it as
another may be revelatory and sudden, it is not possible for a person to see the image as
both things at once.

VI – the Picture-Object

To address the issue of interpretation around pictures, wherein the image of which
the viewer has made a visual appraisal is a 2-dimensional representation of something, where
an appraisal or a “correct appraisal” (if one is to treat the first form of seeing as being a more
correct form of seeing, because it might be more ‘accurate’) of the image relies on identifying
what it is the picture is depicting, not identifying the form of the 2-dimensional image itself,
Wittgenstein proposes the idea of a ‘picture-object,’ a 2-dimensional depiction of something
the viewer knows to be a 3-dimensional thing, which, because of its contextual appearance
and its visual qualities, a person can engage with as if it were a 3-dimensional object.
Wittgenstein gives the example of a ‘picture-face,’ a simple 2-dimensional generic figurative
drawing of a human face. Of the drawing, Wittgenstein proposes that: “In some respects, I
engage with it as with a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the
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expression of the human face” (Wittgenstein 119). This is to say that, while it is evident to
the onlooker that the face (or the ‘picture-object’ generally) is in fact just a 2-dimensional
drawing, the viewer is still able to engage with the image much as they would a real human
face, ascribing to it certain features and speculating as to the emotional state of the figure
depicted in much the way they would if they were looking at a real person. A person, then,
can be fully cognizant that the thing at which they are looking is not a ‘face’ in the
conventional sense, but it can still be appraised along much the same lines. It’s critical to
note here, also, that for the ‘picture-object’ concept to hold up as being the manner in which
somebody actually engages with the face, they must chiefly treat the picture-face as existing
in a different category than a real face, even if the appraisal of the face is similar. This does
not mean simply that they must be cognizant of the fact that they are looking at a 2dimensional figure, but instead means that they articulate that awareness and the
observations made around it clearly and explicitly in how they refer to it using language9.
Wittgenstein illustrates that this would be the case for the ‘picture-object’ model in
his next posit, writing:
I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit
from the first. That is to say, if asked “What’s that?” or “What do
you see there?”, I would have replied: “A picture-rabbit.” If I had
further been asked what that was, I would have explained by
pointing to all sorts of pictures of rabbits, would perhaps have
pointed to real rabbits, talked about their kind of life, or given an
imitation of them (Wittgenstein PII SXI p120).
For the picture-object to take on a form perceptible and identifiable to the viewer, the
viewer must be able to see a connection between the picture-object and the thing that it is
depicting. This is to say that, for the ‘picture-rabbit’ to something with which the onlooker
9

This quality of the manner in which a person speaks of the “picture-object” suggests
something about the kinds of language-usages a person might employ when engaging in
relaying their dreamt experience to another as part of the process of dream interpretation,
although this matter will be explored later into the investigation.
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can engage, it must do so through a kind of implicit reference based upon its
representational similarity to a real rabbit or to another picture rabbit, to which the viewer,
because they have enough of a frame of reference to identify the referent for the pictureobject, can register what it depicts, and can then acknowledge to another in describing their
appraisal of the picture-object as a picture-rabbit.
This kind of model, where the individual identifies that they are looking at a picture
of a rabbit through analogy to their own frame of reference to rabbits and to what rabbits
look like, bears a striking resemblance to a quality in language Wittgenstein identifies in The
Blue Book during his problematizing ostensive definition as a theory for language. In that
discussion, Wittgenstein identifies how, say in the case that someone speaks to two people
about elephants, both individuals immediately will register the meaning of the word elephant
in relation to the animal elephant, but the conception each one holds of the animal species,
their frame of reference for it, their perceptual understanding of it, and the physical
manifestation or visual representation they most associate with elephants, will all be hyperparticularized, such that, while both people are engaged in conversation with a third about
something that they all can register and identify and speak of in language, their particular
awarenesses of elephants will not come to the fore unless disagreement or ambiguity
emerges evidently in the conversation to all parties involved, and therefore certain elements
of what is being said and what is meant by those statements will disappear.
This issue of certain resonances or awarenesses around objects or visual symbols that
are not evinced at all through commonplace language uses intended to refer to those objects
or visual symbols or that are employed to give general description to them is something that
plagues the issue of dreaming, as, for a person to speak of a dream, they need not explain
what particular significance certain facets of that dream may have to them, since those
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resonances may be second-nature in the conception, indeed may not even register at all. This
problem gives clear cause for the need for an ‘interpreter,’ for a trained person (presumably a
psychologist or therapist), to guide the description the other person supplies in such a
manner that those conceptions or unconscious considerations come to the fore; it also,
somewhat paradoxically, makes plain another potential problem with interpretation through
mediation, namely that, although a dreamer may well be able to describe in vivid detail their
dreamt experience, without those other pressing concerns that inform the imagery generated
coming to the fore and being recognized explicitly, a huge payload of the meaning or content of
the dream will be lost, and this loss is practically inevitable, since the mediated interpretation
relies on a fallible mediator from the start. This digression is a significant one, one that will
become central to piecing apart certain especially tricky elements of dreaming later, and it is
for this reason that it has been fleshed out here. But it is not of consequence currently to the
matter at hand, namely the ‘picture-rabbit’ case, to which we will return now.

VII – Resonances Lost

What’s interesting in part about the appraisal of the duck-rabbit as a picture-rabbit
when taken into conversation with Wittgenstein’s destabilizing how people typically conceive
of language in the Blue Book is how the relationship between seeing the duck-rabbit and
identifying the rabbit (and this could go for identifying the duck-rabbit as a duck, too, since
we haven’t yet begun dealing with the particular nuances of this case in relation to the fact
that the image can be seen as either animal) in the image is qualitatively distinct from the
issue at hand in the elephant discussion above. Because of their frame of reference here, the
individual is able to identify in the drawing the likeness of a rabbit (much like how, because
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of their frame of reference in a language game, an individual can hear the word elephant and
comprehend that what is being discussed is the animal that is called an elephant), but unlike
in the language ambiguity case, where the particularized nature of that person’s
understanding of elephants inflects how it is that they proceed in the language game, in a
manner that likely isn’t detectable to another participant, but which affects what it is the
individual wishes to communicate in speaking of elephants, here, the particularized
awareness does not inflect the image at which a person is looking, although it may inflect
their sense of the image, largely in terms of what aspects of the image they glean, and in
terms of the sentiments they may carry with them while looking at the image. As
Wittgenstein articulates in the final sentence of this posit, in giving explanation to the image
to another, if they were to call it a ‘picture-rabbit’ initially, somebody would likely say that
what they see is a picture that represents a rabbit, and they would be able to demonstrate
how that was the case through highlighting their reference points.

VIII – Problematizing the Picture-Object

What is brought out in highest relief by posit 120 is how the person looking on at
the duck-rabbit and identifying only the rabbit is not cognizant of the fact that they are
engaged in an act of seeing as in noticing the rabbit, in large part because they have not seen
the drawing as a duck, and in large part because they are not in the moment cognizant of the
fact that the drawing even can be seen as a duck (presumably, since Wittgenstein makes no
mention of a person relaying to the onlooker that the drawing can be seen in two different
ways, in two separate lights). Here, the act of “seeing as” registers to the individual purely as
perception, and this is made plain by the utterance “I see a picture-rabbit.” In posit 121,
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Wittgenstein truly makes explicit how this act of seeing the duck-rabbit just as a rabbit is a
non-deliberate act, one that registers to the onlooker as purely perceptual, and not
interpretive, by investigating how that quality appears in the language used to describe the
duck-rabbit drawing. Wittgenstein writes:

I would not have answered the question “What do you see here?”
by saying; “Now I see it as a picture-rabbit.” I would simply have
described my perception, just as if I had said “I see a red circle over
there.” Nevertheless, someone else could have said of me: “He sees
the figure as a picture-rabbit.” (Wittgenstein PII SXI p121).
Here, the onlooker does not naturally respond by making a statement like “now I see
it as a picture-rabbit,” where the act of seeing as is acknowledged within the language usage
overtly and through such a usage the onlooker recognizes that they could potentially see the
duck-rabbit as something else, precisely because they themselves are not aware of the
possibility of seeing the thing as something else, or that their mode of seeing the rabbit has
some kind of interpretive element inscribed within it. Instead, they would likely say
something to the tune of “I see a rabbit” or “look at this rabbit,” since they would be
supplying description to something that registers as perception, and that indeed may even be
a form of perception. A relationship between the unconscious and the act of seeing becomes
evident here, in that there must be some sort of connection between the two for a person to
have a natural inclination to look at the duck-rabbit drawing and glean from it only the image
of the rabbit, but the actual nature of that relationship, or the influence of unconscious or
non-deliberate points of consideration over the observation, delineation, and ascription of
association to the duck-rabbit ‘picture-object,’ still remains incredibly murky. And simply
because the connection between the two exists does not necessarily mean that the
description supplied earlier of an act of seeing in this manner as being an interpretive mode
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of seeing even if the element of interpretation does not register to the onlooker continues to
be a sensible one. It could very well be the case that such seeing of the kind described here is
still perceptual seeing, even if the manner in which the image seen is appraised finds itself
influenced by other concerns for the individual not themselves immediately inhered within
the image being shown and not imposed onto the onlooker given the context in which the
image has appeared.
This is made plain by how naturally the identification of the likeness of the rabbit
within the duck-rabbit image is given by the individual, which Wittgenstein raises to a
heightened relief with the red circle description supplied. For the act of seeing the rabbit in
the image to be described, therefore, as an act of seeing as, it must be done by an outside
observer, someone already privy to the fact that the image can be seen in one of two ways to
whom the initial onlooker relays that they see a rabbit. For the individual looking at the
duck-rabbit and seeing in it only the rabbit, who does not know that the image can also be
seen as a duck, again, registering that they’ve committed an act of seeing as is an impossibility.
In fact, whether what they’re actually doing in seeing the rabbit is actually seeing as remains
unclear.
Wittgenstein compounds the emphasis of this point in his next posit, writing:
“It would have made as little sense for me to say ‘Now I see it as…’ as to say at the sight of a
knife and fork ‘Now I see this as a knife and fork.’ This utterance would not be understood.
Any more than: ‘Now it is a fork for me’ or ‘It can be a fork too’” (Wittgenstein PII SXI
p122). It would be unintuitive and unidiomatic—indeed, even senseless—to engage with
commonplace real world objects like a fork and knife and describe identifying them as such
as being some case of seeing the fork and knife as a fork and knife. Nobody, in looking at the
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fork and knife and registering the objects, would ever even entertain thinking of that act of
registering in such terms.
This analogy not only puts to bed the issue of seeing as in relation to the individual
looking at the duck-rabbit and seeing only a rabbit (as Wittgenstein quite emphatically
suggests here that such a case as the person seeing only the rabbit and being unaware of the
possibility to see the image as a duck is not an act of seeing as, and therefore is not
interpretive in the sense that such modes of seeing would be. Whether this is to say that
interpretation itself is not at play in perception, in the first form of seeing, in any capacity, is
unclear, as the dichotomy Wittgenstein draws between those two modes of seeing is not
necessarily so concrete. In fact this whole line of inquiry suggests that the lines between the
two modes blur in some cases, and that some of the same factors are at play in both cases of
seeing, even if the appraisals made that are influenced by those same factors are strikingly
different or have qualitative distinctions between them).
The analogy also begins to allow for problems with the ‘picture-object’ concept to
bubble to the surface, as the rationale for first entertaining the “now I see it as a picturerabbit” utterance as a possible description of the image stems from certain intuitions that
come with the definition supplied for the ‘picture-object’ as a concept, namely that it
operates in such a way where someone can engage with it because of its likeness to
something real, because of its reference to an exterior thing with which people have
experience. Wittgenstein sums this up exactly, writing “One doesn’t ‘take’ what one knows to
cutlery at a mealy for cutlery, any more than one ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth as one
eats, or strives to move it” (Wittgenstein PII SXI p123). Thinking of seeing cutlery on a table
in such terms as are implied by the rejected language usage in p121 involves ascribing a
degree of deliberation to the act of seeing that is inappropriate to the process itself, much in
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the same way one does not even think about moving their mouth while they eat a meal, since
the action is so second-nature that it doesn’t even register as a separate action, or an action a
person must undertake deliberately and consciously.

IX – Lighting Up in Language

Wittgenstein moves from here to proposing a language usage in relation to seeing a
picture-object with multiple potential identifications within it, or multiple ‘aspects’, where
the kind of talk used in the case of the person looking at the duck-rabbit and seeing only the
rabbit, makes sense, and suggests something meaningful about the process of an aspect of an
image ‘lighting up.’ This quite brief scenario proves to be quite a revelatory one, even if it
echoes points made earlier, as it implies a particular kind of additional meaning to terms that
suggest interpretive seeing, or seeing as. Wittgenstein writes: If someone says “Now it’s a
face for me,” then one can ask him: “What changes are you alluding to?” (Wittgenstein PII
SXI p124). The exclamation that the onlooker offers when they’ve noticed a face within the
picture at which they are looking makes plain that an aspect of the image previously
unrecognized has ‘lit up,’ allowing for the viewer to see the whole thing in a new light, in a
new context.
This kind of instance would presumably be a clean and uncomplicated example of
seeing as, where an interpretation of the image has allowed for a person to identify in it
something that they did not see previously. However, the suddenness of the aspect’s
appearing clashes with the conception one would typically hold of interpretation, where the
analysis of the image and the mental drawing of connections between it and other images of
a similar nature and other observed objects in the world presumably would require the kind
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of deliberation Wittgenstein dismisses as being at play in the case of the duck-rabbit taken
only for the rabbit. What’s more, the response by the individual speaking to the onlooker
makes plain that, for the appraisal of the image to have shifted so suddenly, which the
utterance made by the onlooker evinces, something must have changed for the onlooker,
either in terms of the image, or in terms of how they’ve oriented themselves around it. The
suddenness of this expression, and the fact that it takes the form of an exclamation, makes it
seem as if the viewer has almost been struck by the shift in aspect, like something completely
unnoticed previously leapt to the fore for the individual, and their whole mode seeing took
on a new form in an instant.
In analysis, a dreamer might make such an exclamation when they arrive at a breakthrough (this term carries with it exactly the sense of the suddenness of the declaration here,
the unexpectedness of the shift, and the arresting nature of its suddenly overtaking the
dreamer’s previous sense of the image of which they are relaying information), where
suddenly some component of the underlying unconscious concerns that manifested in the
dream as the image being discussed break to the surface, and change totally the impression
the dreamer holds of the image they saw in sleep. In dream interpretation, however, the
dreamer becomes cognizant at the arrival of such a break-through of their seeing-as; indeed,
it may be the moment at which they have clarity for the first time as to their having seen
some non-visual concern or some matter pressing to their psychological considerations as a
visual image, where the delusive impression of their having seen perceptually in their sleep
disperse for the first time, revealing what lay underneath. This need not be the case when the
the viewer says “now it’s a face for me!” in relation to the image that they saw differently
before uttering the remark; although the location of the shift temporally belies that thought
again is seeping into their impression of the image here. And this makes plain a disjuncture
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between seeing and seeing in dreams, where, in dreaming, the aspect of the image previously
unnoticed now lighting up involves the conscious identification of the seepage of thought
into the image (the seeing of thought, or the reclaiming of seeing as) while in looking at an
object while awake, the new aspect registering does not fore the viewer in any capacity to
identify that thought is intermingling with what they see, and may strike them simply as a
new perception.

X – Aspect Shifts, Context, and Framing

Wittgenstein’s next example is one that suggests that such a shift can happen as a
byproduct purely of context, where the other images surrounding the duck-rabbit inflect
directly how a person sees the image itself, even if the shift induced by that context isn’t one
that coheres with what one might initially conceive of as the image’s interpretation, and
which carries fidelity to suggestions made about the immediacy of interpretation in relation
to perception articulated in this exploration earlier. Wittgenstein proposes a scenario where a
person encounters the duck-rabbit image surrounded by other images, writing:
I see two pictures, with the duck-rabbit surrounded by rabbits in
one, by ducks in the other. I don’t notice that they are the same.
Does it follow from this that I see something different in the two
cases?—it gives us a reason for using this expression here
(Wittgenstein PII SXI p125).
In such a case as the one described above, where the duck-rabbit is presented in a context
where the images that surround it, either images of ducks or images of rabbits, inflect what
the onlooker registers the duck-rabbit image to be, the more and more muddy dichotomy
suggested by Wittgenstein’s initial proposal that seeing can happen in two capacities, in a
perceptual capacity and in an interpretive capacity, becomes especially evident. Wittgenstein
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qualifies this case by writing “I don’t notice that they are the same” precisely as to bring to a
relief the tension between the fact that the duck-rabbit can be seen potentially as either a duck
or as a rabbit, suggesting that registering either image in the depiction is an interpretive act of
seeing, and that, and that seeing it as one thing or another, both in the previous case
discussed and especially in this one, where the registering of the rabbit when the duck-rabbit
is surrounded by rabbits and the duck when the duck-rabbit is surrounded by ducks, appears
to be something more akin to the first case of seeing, to perceptual seeing. If this is the case,
if one treats the mode of seeing that occurs when the person notices the rabbit in the duckrabbit when it is surrounded by rabbits, and then sees the duck when the duck-rabbit is
surrounded by ducks, and does not register that the duck-rabbit itself is the same image, and
simply lends itself by its design to being seen one way or another, as being of the order of
the “seeing,” and not “seeing as,” it invites someone seriously to entertain the proposal with
which Wittgenstein closes the above posit, that the person looking at these two different
presentations is in fact seeing two different things in each case, and not that they are seeing
the duck-rabbit as one thing in the first case, and as something else in the other.

XI – Recognizing the Duck-Rabbit

Wittgenstein then suggests the kind of reaction someone might exclaim at
discovering that the duck-rabbit drawing contained in each of the two different pictures
looked at by the individual in the previous premise are in fact the same image: ‘“I saw it quite
differently, I’d never have recognized it!” Now, that is an exclamation. And there is also a
justification for it” (Wittgenstein PII SXI p126). In what manner the individual has
discovered that the duck-rabbit is the same duck-rabbit in both different pictures is not
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evident here; whether they’ve gleaned it through their own scrutiny of the images, or
whether they’ve been informed of the duck-rabbit image being present and central in both
pictures is unclear simply from the utterance employed above. But in addition, the manner in
which they’ve ascertained that to be the case is in some ways irrelevant to the utterance itself,
and to the point Wittgenstein is attempting to make by relaying it: the comment made by the
individual once they are aware that the duck-rabbit is the same image present in both is, like
the earlier statements of “I see a rabbit”, or “I saw a duck,” a statement of perception; by
uttering “I saw it quite differently,” the speaker is not implying any kind of interpretive seeing
as of the nature outlined in the previous premises, but is making a statement of the kind that
falls in line with statements about seeing, about perceptual image appraisal, even if some sort
of change is implied by the statement in terms of how the image can be seen in one case or
another.
The actual exclamation itself, however, lends itself here to the reader assuming that
Wittgenstein is in fact correct in suggesting that, before the viewer of the two duck-rabbitcontaining pictures is cognizant of the fact that the duck-rabbit is repeated in each, they saw
two different, distinct things, a duck in one case, and a rabbit in the other, and that their
seeing the duck-rabbit image in these two separate ways is not a seeing of the second nature,
that because the image registered differently in the separate contexts, the images the viewer
identified, or the likenesses, were different. The closing of the exclamation, where the viewer
asserts that “I’d never have recognized it,” affirms that to the viewer the two images were in
fact separate, and that, therefore, they were not cognizant of interpretation at play, if it even
was in the capacity that one might suspect. It seems at this point then that we should take
such a case as the one of the person looking at the duck-rabbit superimposed in the two
separate context-laden images (the one with ducks surrounding the duck-rabbit, the others
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with rabbits surrounding the duck-rabbit) and identifying the duck-rabbit as a duck in one
case and the rabbit as another as being one where interpretation in the manner associated
with seeing as clearly is not at play, where the issue of aspects lighting up in an image, likewise,
does not apply, since the viewer is not seeing the same image “in new lights” in each case,
but is in fact seeing different things.
But this mode of comparison around the duck-rabbit, where the image is
superimposed in two distinct contexts, one surrounded by ducks, the other by rabbits, and
the viewer takes in the image in each separate context, and notices separate faces given what
surrounds the “picture-object,” is not how a person would immediately intuit to engage in
appraising such a picture that can shift back and forth in what the viewer registers it as being.
Wittgenstein speaks to this, and potentially to other unusual qualities of the case described
above, in one of his more cryptic posits during his investigation into visual appraisal. While
this may not explicitly be what Wittgenstein means to address in his description of the
unusualness of this kind of suggested context for observation, it’s certainly suggested, and its
suggestion is important, since it carries with it further implications about the previouslyproposed “picture-object” concept, and also addresses some of the potential contrivance
that has carried through thus far in how engagement with image has been presented in Part
II Section xi. Following his proposal of the exclaimed “I saw it quite differently,”
Wittgenstein writes:
I’d never have thought of superimposing the heads in this way, of
comparing them in this way. For they suggest a different mode of
comparison.
The head seen in this way hasn’t even the slightest similarity to
the head seen in that way—although they are congruent
(Wittgenstein PII SXI p127).
Intuitively, the onlooker wouldn’t expect to encounter the duck-rabbit in the two separate
contexts, and wouldn’t anticipate the presentation. Indeed, the whole mode of presentation,

It Will Depend on How the Question is Used

53

where the duck-rabbit is superimposed into the two different “framing” images, is one of
which only a person devising a particular mode of viewing where a certain kind of appraisal
of the image is induced into the viewer would naturally conceive10. And this is important, as
it belies the fact that the seeing of the duck-rabbit as one thing in one context and another in
the other is much closer to something perceptual than it is to something interpretive. After
the viewer has realized that the central image in both “framing” pictures is the same, the
duck-rabbit, they may very well “see anew” in thinking about how to present the image to
induce similar responses form others.

XIII – Doing Away with the Picture-Object

But the final point Wittgenstein makes is a critical one here, because based on how
the image registers to the viewer in each case, before they’ve realized in both contexts that
they are looking at the duck-rabbit, a comparison between the two images would seem
unnecessary, or wouldn’t even jump to mind (it would seem like comparing apples to
oranges), even though the duck-rabbit “picture-object” is the same in both cases, since
indeed the viewer believes they are looking at two different images, since they are seeing two
different things. If indeed we are to treat this case as a case of seeing in the first sense, of
perceptual seeing, the possibility of the “picture-object” being an accurate way of describing
the duck-rabbit, or two dimensional depictions of things in general, since the viewer can only
10

Such a case is of the kind that a therapist might engage in trying to position a sequence in a
dream in a particular context for the dreamer, where either the identification of particular
sequences that frame an image of primary concern for the viewer is used to help push
upwards the underlying considerations dictating the appearance of the image, or where the
bracketing of the dream itself into a context with borders demarcated by particular lived
experiences that the therapist can identify as being especially pertinent to the image being
analyzed are used to aid the viewer in unmasking the concern underlying the image they
generated in their dream.
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be seeing two different things, can only think that they are seeing two different things, if they
are not immediately cognizant of the fact that they are looking at a 2-dimensional image. This
is not to say that they are not aware that the thing at which they are looking is a 2dimensional drawing, something that does not occupy space, that is representational; but
they take the image to be the thing it is depicting, they identify what it depicts and engage
with it in such order, placing primacy on the depiction. They do not see the picture-face as a
picture-face; they do not see the picture-face as a face. They see a face. They do not see the
duck-rabbit as a duck or a rabbit; they see a duck; they see a rabbit. This being a case of
perceptual-seeing would be impossible otherwise. A person would be have to begin with
interpretation to identify anything in the image otherwise; they would have to work from the
2-dimensional image and construct from it an awareness of its depicting something.
This quality is evinced throughout this whole exploration of the issue of image
appraisal thus far, and from the engagement with language usages around them as
Wittgenstein presents them and interrogates them. The fact that a person in the moment
engages with the 2-dimensional image like they would a real 3-dimensional thing is revelatory,
and is especially critical when we return to thinking of dreams and of dreaming, since it
makes plain that, while the dreamer is engaging with visual stimuli that are imagined, they
perceive those things as being real while they sleep, and they do not “take the images as
something,” they see the thing that has manifested itself visually. If in a dream, for example, I
believe that I’m in the atrium of a large apartment complex with escalators stretching from
the ground floor to the roof, I treat what I am seeing, where I am, as if it is real, I take it to
be real. And I do not see something—some “sense-data” encountered by my body while it is
asleep that has been transmuted into the dream or that has informed the pieces that
constitute the dream I am undergoing (and also “generating”) or some underlying
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psychological concern manifested into the imagery—as the apartment complex with the
atrium and the escalator array; such a conception could only be applied after the fact. I see
the atrium in the apartment building; I see the escalator. What’s more, when someone wakes
from the dream, and returns to the world of “waking life,” they do not reconfigure their
experience as being one where they saw something as something else. In relaying the dream
to a friend, I would never say “In my dream I saw something as an apartment complex.”
One, likewise, would not say “What I dreamt I took to be an apartment complex with an
atrium and an escalator array that stretched to the roof of the building.” One would say “I
dreamt I was in the atrium of an apartment building with an escalator that stretched to its
roof” or “I dreamt I was in an apartment building, standing at its atrium, and that in front of
me was a massive escalator array that went from the building’s base to the building’s roof.”
Even after the fact, once I’m awake, and the unreality of a continuous escalator that does not
wrap around levels, that continues in a constant procession upwards, has registered to me, I
still would not think of what I saw and experienced in an interpretive capacity11.

11

This becomes complicated with lucid dreaming, where a person can register that they are
dreaming while they are within a dreaming state, while they are “in the dream,” but such a
revelation doesn’t result in an ‘aspect shift’ in the way necessitated by seeing as; the dreamer
does not start to think that they are seeing something as a certain thing because they are
cognizant of its non-reality; instead, they become aware of their ability to transform the thing,
to dictate what it is they see. They become free to transform the trappings around them at
will, but they do not register their seeing as being markedly non-perceptual seeing. Even if
they begin to alter the fixtures of their dreams, they still see the things perceptually, like they
would if they were awake and looking at something in the manner they do at the duck-rabbit
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Interpretation

Through interpretation, through the mediating forces supplied by relaying the dream
through language to another (again, likely a therapist or psychologist), a person can shift to
seeing their perception (or what in the dream registered like perception) as a certain thing,
indeed can even come to re-contextualize what they “saw” while they slept as being a case of
seeing as, but this largely requires a person’s identifying that what it is they saw in the dream
was a manifestation of likely a non-visual artifact of the unconscious pressing to the surface
of the mind and taking form as a particular physical or structural thing within the dream. But
this very quality, that the thing seen initially in the dream registered to the dreamer
perceptually, that they saw something and took it to be a certain thing without a striking and
apparent interpretive function rising to the fore, carries over even after the dreamer has
awoken, and has engaged in a mediation of their dream where, through interpretation,
they’ve arrived at an understanding of the image’s symbolic significance. The actual
experience they had of seeing the image in their dream remains an experience of perception,
even after the dreamer has become aware that other forces were at play that inflected the
image, that indeed even inspired them to make/generate the image while they dreamt.
This phenomenon is also at play in the case of the duck-rabbit even after the
possible shift over to being able to see as with the duck-rabbit has been made, which
Wittgenstein articulates in the next premise. Wittgenstein describes this shift and the
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continuity of the initial perceptual seeing being evinced through language usages describing
the duck-rabbit image, writing:
I’m shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say “It’s a rabbit”.
Not “Now it’s a rabbit”. I’m reporting my perception.—I’m
shown the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say “It’s a duckrabbit”. But I may also react to the question quite differently.—The
answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a perception;
the answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is not. Had I replied “It’s a rabbit”,
the ambiguity would have escaped me, and I would have been
reporting my perception (Wittgenstein PII Sxi p128).
Something especially of note here is the actual ambiguity of the initial question posed to the
viewer, of “what is it?”. While the utterance is an immensely terse one, and a simple question
in that it is of the kind that even a child could be expected to answer with ease, what it is that
is being asked of the individual remains somewhat unclear. It’s not immediately apparent
whether the question being asked is one akin to “what is it depicting?,” or closer to “what is
the drawing?” or to “What do you see?”. And it is in part for this reason that there is such an
abundance of potential answers to the question in this case.
In the first case, where the individual is asked and responds with the answer “it’s a
rabbit,” the report supplied is one of perceptual seeing, as we’ve explored previously, since it
attests to the image being a rabbit and implies no kind of mediation on the part of the viewer
as to how the rabbit is seen. The answer “now it’s a rabbit” isn’t supplied again because it
would be unintuitive as a response, unless the viewer were cognizant of the possibility for
the duck-rabbit to be seen either as a rabbit or as a duck, and even in the case that they were
aware of how the image functions, the answer “now it’s a rabbit” would still seem to be an
unnatural one, since, if indeed the viewer knew the duck-rabbit and how it behaves as a 2dimensional image, they likely wouldn’t describe their experience with the image in the
temporal manner implied by “now it’s a rabbit,” since the utterance carries with it an
implication that the image itself is shifting, not their impression of it (which, again, if the
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person were aware of how the duck-rabbit functioned, if they’d seen it both possible manners
previously, they’d likely described saying “I see it as a rabbit,” since they would likely employ
their language to locate the change in how the image registers with themselves, not with the
duck-rabbit itself).
Wittgenstein also notes that a person could also respond to the initial question with
“it’s a duck-rabbit,” which, based on the first proposed response, suggests that an individual
is far more likely, if they’ve encountered the duck-rabbit previously, and are aware of how
the image operates, to respond to the question by identifying the duck-rabbit image as the
duck-rabbit image than they are to describe “what it is” in the expected supplying of a
“perceptual seeing statement” or the unusual terms of the utterance “now it’s a rabbit.” The
response of “It’s a duck-rabbit” seems to suggest a reaffirmation of the idea of the pictureobject, but such a response would likely only be supplied if the individual looking at the
duck-rabbit were familiar with the image already and were aware of the possibility for the
image to “shift” in how it is seen between one thing and the other. In such a case, then, the
response would not be a refutation of what’s been suggested by the analysis of the premises
leading up to 128 supplied herein, since that individual would likely have already gone
through the experience of seeing the image perceptually, identifying one thing in it, and then
maybe the other, and the response of “it’s a duck-rabbit,” would only be possible because,
after being informed of the possibility for the image to register as the duck or as the rabbit,
the quality of the image to shift—indeed the fact that the duck-rabbit is something that exists
not so much as a representation but as an exercise in gestalt—would take primacy for the
viewer in relation to the image over what they might actually see—what they might identify
the image to depict—in looking at it.
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But again, even in such a case, the report the individual is making is a perceptual
report, since it involves an identification of the duck-rabbit image, a perceiving of the image
in the terms that it is appearing (which, though it resembles what the “picture-object”
concept suggests about how people view images, does not carry with it the same implications
at all, since it does not require that first a person identifies explicitly that they are looking at a
2-dimensional object, then, after that identification and the engagement with that object, see
an affinity between it and something within the real world; instead, the order is reversed,
where the person sees the image first and identifies in it the duck or the rabbit, then, after
being told the nature of the image as a kind of gestalt, treats the image as chiefly a 2dimensional image that can be seen in multiple manners). What’s more, Wittgenstein
qualifies this potential response by saying the viewer “may say” it’s a duck-rabbit, implying
that, while this answer is a possible one to the question of “what is it?,” it’s not necessarily
fair to expect it as a response, something that denotes the response of “it’s a duck-rabbit”
itself as being a less immediately intuitive one than “it’s a rabbit,” one that could only really
be anticipated in a context where the viewer has seen the image previously.
And “now it’s a rabbit,” unlike the other two potential responses suggested herein,
wouldn’t be a perceptual statement, because of how it recognized the possibility for the
image to register differently at different points in time, an inflection of the image itself that is
interpretive, that requires a blurring together of thinking with seeing in the viewer, since the
potential for the image to appear differently to the viewer is not something actually inhered
within the duck-rabbit image itself. There’s nothing about the drawing that allows for the
viewer to register that the image can register in two distinct manners to the onlooker,
nothing that suggests a possibility for the image to be seen as one thing or another. Either
the viewer sees the rabbit, or the duck. And once they’ve seen both depictions within the
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image, they can ascertain the manner in which the image can be appraised in two distinct
manners. This would mean that, for the viewer to say “now it’s a rabbit,” they again would
have to be cognizant of how the image can be seen in two ways, would likely have had to see
the rabbit, and then the duck. Any other conception of the utterance “now it’s a rabbit”
making sense as a response in relation to an initial impression of the duck-rabbit would
require the viewer to be clairvoyant, and even in that case, the description supplied of what
the duck-rabbit “is” would not be one of a “sense-impression” in the sense that has been
discussed throughout so far.
What remains most unclear here is what—if there is something explicitly that
Wittgenstein means to suggest by saying that “I may react to the question quite
differently”—the viewer may say in response to the initial question of “What is it?” It is for
this reason that the identification of the initial question’s ambiguity is so critical, since its
ambiguity in relation to what precisely the “it” is that the viewer is meant to identify may
well be responsible for the possibility that a viewer “might respond to the question quite
differently.” A viewer may well recognize that the question does not necessarily “cohere”
with what they see, or how they see the duck-rabbit, and they might respond by asking for a
clarification. They may try and delineate what it is they see “in” the image, or what they
identify the image to be, from the image itself. They may offer a response that is anecdotal,
or that inflects the questioner’s sense of what the image “is” with details unrelated to the
image itself but strikingly interconnected to the viewer’s perception of it (this would be a
case of seeing as in the manner Wittgenstein initially fashions the two modes of seeing,
although it may not actually so rigidly fit to that bifurcated model for modes of seeing). They
may say “it’s a rabbit, but I also know it’s a 2-dimensional drawing,” where the seeing of the
rabbit is a perceptual mode of seeing, thereby keeping with the idea that the “picture-object”
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model is inapplicable as a way of categorizing seeing in relation to 2-dimensional pictures,
but which also offers clear acknowledgment of the viewer’s recognition that the image at
which they are looking is a 2-dimensional image, and not a real living rabbit (this case is
conceivable, sure, but, like the “it’s a duck-rabbit” response, isn't likely to be encountered in
the kind of scenario described above). What begins to take form from this potential
multiplicity of different responses Wittgenstein suggests with the middle remark in this posit
is something actually quite critical about images, about “meaning” in relation to images, and
about the manner in which language inflects visual perception and image appraisal.
The question “what is it?” asks for the viewer to conceive of their answer within a
particular framework, wherein their relaying of their sense of the duck-rabbit is to be
presented in a manner that aligns with the initial question. Because of this quality of the
question, and because of the ambiguity of the question as it relates to what “it” is meant to
register as being to the viewer, the person must assess first if contextually the question being
asked is one requesting information about their impression of the image, and must from
there attempt to align what it is they see (or what it is they take the image to be) with the
brackets posed by the initial question. The broadness of the question and the non-immediacy
of what is meant by “it” creates a framework where the viewer’s sense of the image is
inflected by trying to align what it is that they see with the “frame” implied by the question
(which granted, is a pretty ambiguous frame, but which, because of this opaqueness, and
because the viewer is not being asked to make a comment on what they see, but instead on
what the thing they’re looking at is, leads the viewer to try and search for an interpretation of
the question that allows for their “sense impression” to be a sensible one in their relaying).
The question itself, in terms of how it forces the viewer to reconfigure their actual
seeing so that it coheres with the framework of what it is that they are being asked to convey,
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evinces how language forces a viewer to describe their perception in a way that alters the
actual perception, or that re-contextualizes the experience of looking at the image in a way
that permanently changes that impression. Seeing, then, occurs in a manner directed by
language, and acts of seeing can be mutated or reshaped based on the language
accompanying those acts, based on the linguistic context in which a person encounters an
image, and through the formulation of words the viewer chooses to best relay or to
communicate elements of their seeing to another, and based on the kind of language used to
request from the viewer an inclination as to what it is they see, as to how they see, and as to
what they notice and identify in the images at which they look.
If someone goes to an art museum, for example, and looks at a painting of women
dancing in masks, one produced in the cubist style (think here of Picasso’s Les Demoiselles
d’Avignon, a part of the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art), how they see
the image, what they see in the image, will be heavily inflected by whether they look first at
the accompanying statement fixed next to the image, or whether they ignore it completely. If
they glance at the painting first, then at the statement, then back up at the painting, their
impression of the painting will be shaped by their newfound awareness of the artist, and of
the period in which it was produced. They may initially see simply women in masks, and
identify to some degree the colors used to depict the women, to paint upon their faces the
masks. But after glancing at the placard, they will start to notice similarities and
discontinuities with other paintings of the same time, will start to identify embellishments
and flourishes within the brushstrokes that are signatures of the artist, will begin to consider
the particular painting at which they are looking with other paintings produced by the same
artist. If, by contrast, they were to decide to forego completely looking at the placard, and
instead sit and gaze at the painting for a prolonged period of time, taking it in, observing and

It Will Depend on How the Question is Used

63

absorbing its particularities and its subtleties, their sense of the painting would be a radically
different one.
Does this difference in what is noticed rely on that same division as the one between
“seeing” and “seeing as”? It’s not immediately clear here, although saying simply in one case
that “I see women in masks” or “I see a painting of women in masks” (which, again, would
be unintuitive, although it makes more sense to speak this way in this context than it would
when speaking of the duck-rabbit or the “picture-face”) and in the other “I see a Picasso” or
“I see it as a Picasso, one that depicts five nude women in masks” does not capture
completely the differences in what is observed depending on the awareness of the viewer
about the work or the context in which the image is being observed. Now, what we are
speaking about is largely context, and so we are speaking more of how information dictates
perception than how language usages around images do, but this is still information being
presented in language, and the terms chosen to present that information no doubt inform
how the viewer engages with that information before looking at the painting.
Suppose, for a moment, another onlooker at the museum pulls the viewer aside and
says something to the effect of “notice their eyes,” and the viewer takes in the eyes of the
women in such a manner that a new aspect of the painting “lights up” and the viewer’s
whole sense of the painting reforms. The viewer’s sense of the painting has changed, and
that change has been inspired by an utterance, one that carries with it certain presumptions
about the image, about the painting, and about what should serve as a point of focus for
someone engaging with the work. Suppose, instead, that somebody pulls the viewer aside
and says “notice the angular nature of the contours around the center of the face, and the
simplicity in form and the distinctness between the different colors used to paint the eyes,
that they’re not blended, and that they’ve been painted in a way that somebody might initially
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take as crude,” and the viewer re-examines the image with a scrutiny to these particular
formal details around the eyes in such a fashion that, again, something revelatory appears to
the viewer upon their inspection, and the whole “sense” of the painting transforms, a new
aspect again lights up.
Is this a different aspect? Of course! In both cases, the viewer’s sense of the image is
redirected and informed by an utterance, by a suggestion made in language. But is the thing
to which that suggestion is made the same in both cases? The answer would seem to be both
yes and no. In both cases the other gallery-goer is making reference to the eyes of the
women in suggesting that the viewer inspect the image differently, but the terms in which
they are describing them, the manner in which they have appraised the image, are radically
different, so much so that the actual features of the painting being highlighted may
themselves be different features. And yet they are parts of the same thing.
This sort of case makes plain how language can inflect and inform the sense of the
image the viewer has, how it is that they see the thing at which they look. In both cases, the
initial viewer comes away having scrutinized the same image, but with totally different
impressions of the thing. Unlike in the duck-rabbit case, though, where the image presented
offers two different “depictions” for the viewer to identify, where the viewer sees a rabbit,
and then a duck, and in that way, “sees” two different things explicitly, here, the viewer
seems to be “seeing the image differently” in the two cases. What’s not immediately
apparent, here, however, is whether the seeing that’s occurring is a perceptual seeing of the
image strictly, in which case the elements of the image identified in each of the two different
viewings actually involve identifying qualities inhered within the image, or whether the seeing
occurring is a form of seeing as, where the identified qualities of the image are ones that rely
upon some interpretive mode for the viewer, and which may involve a kind of mapping onto
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the painting certain qualities not actually evinced by or contained within the image itself. But
the frequency with which these kinds of separate forms of seeing occur, the seriousness with
which they’re often discussed, and the kind of value ascribed to them in how they actually
can afford for revelation about images to appear, make plain that, if there are indeed two
different modes of seeing, those two modes do not exist in some kind of hierarchical
relationship where perception is privileged over interpretation. And even more pressing, by
this point in Wittgenstein’s investigation and in our exploration of that discussion of how we
see, the boundaries between the two modes of seeing proposed at the outset are wholly
blurred, and some relationship between seeing and thinking that carries through in all cases
of observing an image is suggested. But it is evident here, if language is informing how a
viewer sees the image at which they are looking, that thought seeps into what we see, and
that simply classifying that thought as being something interpretive, something that renders
the whole act of seeing markedly separate from seeing in a strictly perceptual sense, actually
wrongly categorizes how thought works, and actively misguides us into thinking of seeing as
a whole phenomenon in a manner that is wrongheaded.
But to return to the suggestions made at the close of our exploration of language and
its influence over image appraisal, as we explored through the sections on the painting of the
women in masks. We will resume our discussion of p128, around which some critical pieces
of information have still been left on the table, but this juncture renders a prime opportunity
to explore an element of seeing about which we’ve spoken quite a bit thus far, but for which
no explanation has been supplied, no serious inquiry has been endeavored. One component
of Wittgenstein’s conception of seeing, one that is critical in understanding how people see
images and how those images register in different manners depending on how the person is
seeing, such that they take on a multiplicity of meanings, such that new, separate qualities
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come to the fore in our looking at something again, in our re-examining it and seeing it anew,
that has gone largely unexplored so far is this idea of something “lighting up,” of a new
aspect of an image appearing suddenly to a viewer and changing their sense of the thing at
which they are looking. While it’s certainly been at play in much of our exploration of the
duck-rabbit and during our refutation of the idea of the picture-object, how the
phenomenon operates, and how it relates to the dichotomized model for seeing Wittgenstein
proposes at the opening of Part II Section XI, has largely gone without explanation. This
hasn’t been done purely because such a process is one that can be understood intuitively; in
fact, far from it. Aspect change is one of the elements of our visual experience of the world
with the utmost primacy, and is at play basically whenever we have a revelation about visual
imagery, about the images at which we look. And the phenomenon serves as a neat
intersection point for much we have yet to explore, but that has been suggested, about both
image appraisal, its relying on some sort of relationship between thought and vision, and
about images themselves. Wittgenstein first addresses the issue of aspect change overtly in
the premise that follows p128, writing:
The change of aspect. “But surely you’d say that the picture has
changed altogether now!”
But what is different: my impression? My attitude?—Can I say?
I describe the change like a perception; just as if the object had
changed before my eyes. (Wittgenstein PII Sxi p129).
Again, here we encounter an issue around our locating through language what precisely has
changed when a new aspect emerges for the viewer upon their glancing at the image. Unlike
in the case before, where what the “it” in the question “what is it?” creates an ambiguity for
the viewer that makes it more difficult to communicate what they see in the image at which
they are looking without mutating or reforming their conception of the image, here, with the
initial utterance of “But surely you’d say that the picture has changed altogether now”, the
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language usage creates an issue around localizing what about the image permitted for a new
aspect to appear, for a quality previously unnoticed to emerge while the viewer sees the
image that reshapes their sense of the thing at which they are looking. Wittgenstein here is
gesturing to the complicated interplay between viewer and image, and to certain conceptions
we might hold about things at which we look in relation to our thoughts. To say that the
picture has changed altogether seems actually quite natural as a response somebody would
have to another person saying “I see something completely different,” or “I see the picture
so differently, or “what I see has shifted!” or “I see something new!” Here, the viewer
looking at the image, for whom a certain new element, an aspect, has “lit up,” indeed sees
the image in a new light, and that shift, where something wholly distinct from how the image
registered previously, makes the image itself seem different, seem changed. The issue here,
of course, is that the image itself hasn’t actually shifted; it has remained the same, in how it
exists separate from the viewer. Yet the ability for an appraisal of the image, for a seeing of
the thing, to register as so wholly divorced from the manner in which it was seen upon first
glance, renders it to the viewer as changed on some level, like it itself has shifted into being
something wholly new. The image cannot really be chimerical, and yet it seems to the viewer
as if it must be, given how distinct, how different, their seeing the image is now. Yet the fact
that the viewer describes what they see still in perceptual terms, saying “I see it differently,”
makes it appear as if the way in which the onlooker conceives of the image is indeed one
where the image has shifted. And this identification by Wittgenstein of the “seeing anew”
taking form in language as an act of perceptual seeing also draws the reader’s attention to the
difficulty and opacity presented by trying to locate what has changed.
Is it that the impression of the image held by the viewer has changed, or that some
detail the viewer didn’t register previously floated to the fore for them upon looking and
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realigned their whole conception of the image? Is this a case of different associations,
different sentiments than those present upon first viewing inspiring the viewer to see the
image at which they are looking in a wholly new way? It’s not immediately clear, and part of
the issue here comes with trying to localize the change in aspect, trying to pinpoint a
particular location at which the shift has occurred. If the image itself indeed has not shifted,
then it would seem to follow that the change must be an interior one for the viewer,
something within them shifted such that their sense of the image is now changed.
But for this to be the case, it would require us to adopt a model for looking that we
haven’t entertained in any capacity previously, namely one where a viewer generates an
interior image of the thing at which they are looking, and that their sense of the exterior image
being appraised relies on the manner in which this interior image has been given form
internally. But this sort of model seems to make no sense, since it takes away the idea of
reference, and it nullifies much of what has been discussed in relation to seeing as. If this
were to be the model that made sense for image appraisal, then the case of the duck-rabbit
registering differently based on the “frame” in which it’s presented would make no sense,
since in those cases, the duck-rabbit itself would be isolated, inscribed into the viewer’s
interior, and then inspected in isolation, such that the other images around it have no
bearing on the interior image. Additionally, if this model were to be the case, then changes of
aspect would result from vividness and definition, where the initial seeing would be like a
rough sketch, and the “seeing anew” closer to a finished draft of the image. But we are
talking about a person seeing an image differently, not more vividly, and no premium has been
placed on the latter form of seeing over the former. Indeed, no real hierarchy of modes of
seeing has been implied, now that the initial bifurcated model for seeing has been drawn into
question. So it can’t possibly be that the change in aspect is a result of some internal image
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(which the term “impression,” which has been used to describe acts of seeing throughout
this work, implies; although it is not meant to be used in this sense here, except for in the
above-quoted p129 from Wittgenstein) being refigured or re-etched.
An internal picture framework too would largely clash with much Wittgenstein
argues in relation to language, namely that there exists no “pre-linguistic” mode of cognition,
where thought exists in a capacity uninfluenced by language. The internal-picture model
would imply that this is not the case, and would imply that something akin to a private
language is possible; and since we’ve already discussed the matter of language inflecting how
we see, the interior picture explanation ceases to be sensible. Wittgenstein arrives at this very
point in p133 of Part II Section xi, writing:
The concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading, since the model for
this concept is the ‘outer picture’; and yet the uses of these conceptwords are no more like one another than the uses of “numeral” and
“number”. (Indeed, someone who was inclined to call numbers
‘ideal numerals’ could generate a similar confusion by doing so.)
(Wittgenstein PII Sxi p133).
The point here is really driven home by how obviously incongruous the concepts of “inner
picture” and “outer picture” actually are with one another, rendering this kind of conception
of visual perception, which presumes a possibility of a kind of mirroring, truly delusive,
basically nonsensical. An outer image functions like a referent, in that the individual does
observe it and make appraisals of it, but the impression that the individual has of the image
is not the kind of thing that exists purely through a relationship of reference between an
interior and an exterior. Likewise, the inner picture model would convolute the issue of
reference in a profound and delusive way, since it would require the individual to see an
outer image, reproduce it accurately and unconsciously within their mind, have that new
image exist in a relatively fixed capacity, and then inspect the new inner image as a referent,
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making judgments based on something present internally, divorced from an outside world.
This kind of model for perception would in fact be patently non-perceptual, and would rely
fully on a kind of deliberate and scrutinizing thinking that actually holds little weight when
taken into consideration with how we actually think about images, how we actively engage
with images, as has been demonstrated consistently throughout this investigation of image
appraisal thus far.
But if this is not the case, then the change that occurs when a person notices a new
aspect, indeed is “struck” by a new view of the object (notice the wording here; it’s an
intuitive description, yet it highlights the complicated nature of the concept), becomes
especially hard to explain, since it would seem that the change in how the image is perceived
would require for the image to change itself. The fact that it does not, even though the
whole conception the viewer holds of the image has shifted radically, creates such a level of
confusion for the viewer because of the degree to which it does not cohere with the actual
sensory experience of looking at an object and registering something completely different
about the image being appraised. And this kind of complicated sense of incoherence in
relation to the aspect shift stems largely from attempting to give explanation to how the
image can shift in how it is seen by trying to locate a source of change, by trying to pinpoint
a particular facet of the viewing experience, or to identify a vey particular and discrete
terminus with the image in relation to the viewer from which the change in aspect can
become sensible. Again, the image has not changed, and what exactly, in one particular
instance of a new aspect “lighting up” for the viewer, allowed for the change in image
appraisal to occur, cannot be taken to be common across all cases where a person “sees
anew” in relation to imagery. The going-between for the viewer in seeing the duck-rabbit,
where the viewer may register the rabbit, and then suddenly see the image completely
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differently, as the duck, is not a kind of shift that happens uniformly across cases, even if the
resulting shift in appraisal is the same.
Further, identifying in an image something that was not seen previously does not
nullify the previous perception of the image, or render it wholly inaccessible. While it may be
difficult for the original perception to be reclaimed, where the viewer both remains aware of
their first “seeing” of the image and can still see the image in the same manner that it was
seen initially, it is possible, although it may occur now with a certain kind of deliberation on
the part of the viewer that did not factor into the initial seeing of the image and the kind of
registering the viewer did of that image when it was first encountered. That a “goingbetween” of image appraisals is possible, and that these different image appraisals are
articulated by the viewer in perceptual terms, suggests a model for a viewer’s sense of an
image where the image for the viewer consists of an overlay of different “sense-impressions,”
different seen qualities that begin to stack on top of each other and that overlay in how the
viewer conceives of the image itself.
Again, this conception of visual appraisal thrusts itself forward through the kinds of
language usages people employ when actually speaking of a shift in how the image is seen, in
asserting the registering of a new and distinct visual appraisal of the image of which they
previously had a different sense. Wittgenstein identifies this quality of the language through
which people speak of aspect shifts by pointing to an unusual dissonance between how a
person both asserts that they’ve seen something new and makes reference to the continuity
of their first visual impression when speaking of something “lighting up” for them in
relation to an image. Wittgenstein writes of this quality of the articulation of a new
impression of the image that:
“Ah, now I see this”, I might say (pointing to another picture, for
example). This has the form of a report of a new perception. The
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expression of a change of aspect is an expression of a new
perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged
perception (Wittgenstein PII Sxi p130).
What's immediately notable here, unlike in the context presented with the duck-rabbit in
p128, is that the viewer expresses their registering of a new aspect by saying “now I see this,”
and that in this context, such an utterance makes sense, is even an intuitive way of phrasing
the expression of something new appearing. And unlike in the previous context, where the
statement is markedly not of the kind that articulates a perception, here, as Wittgenstein notes
in the closing of this posit, the remark is a gesture towards a new perception, a sort of
exclamation of a new registering of something about the image that was not noticed
previously, but is also a reference to the initial perception. This occurs because the
exclamation of “now I see this” is one a recognition of the temporality of the aspect change
is couched in the utterance, because the viewer is recognizing themselves, is, by making
themselves the subject of the utterance, as opposed to the image at which they are looking,
locating that they are, at this particular moment in time, seeing something distinct from what
they saw previously. Unlike the dismissed utterance “Now it’s a rabbit” in p128, where the
phraseology implies that the image has actually shifted, has changed as time has passed, here,
the viewer recognizes in their expression that their perception has shifted, that they’ve
identified something new in the image, and their utterance does not here imply that their
new observation is contingent on a certain kind of shift manifesting itself visually within the
image12. And what’s complicated in this case is the manner in which the expression of the
12

This is an impossibility in regards to images, maybe with the exception of something like a
hologram, although such a case is an unusual one, since a hologram is definitively not a fixed
image, and therefore does not cohere with our expectation of an image with which we’d
engage, and bears more in common with a sequence of images, or with a film, where
multiple images are being shown over a set period of time. Exploring perception to images
of this nature would no doubt be a revelatory pursuit, but the line of investigation is not
relevant to dreaming, and for this reason, we will not be engaging with cases like these. Still,
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new visual perception is at once a reference to the previous impression of the image; indeed,
to say that the viewer is seeing as in this case seems hard to justify, as there is nothing that
qualifies that the elements of the image identified in the new perceptual identification are
ones that are inflected by a certain level of different associations divorced from the image or
different concerns not immediately relevant to the image at hand overtaking the viewer’s
perception or inflecting the manner in which the viewer sees the image; and yet, just as with
the previous case of a person using now in reference to the thing at which they are looking,
the viewer’s acknowledgment of their perception being rooted in time makes plain that there
is some degree of thought at play in their current visual appraisal. To call that thought
interpretive seems too strong, but there is still some degree of thinking at play, since, for the
viewer to be able to recognize that their impression of the image has changed, they must be
cognizant of their previous impression of the image, and they must have that awareness sit in
play with the new aspect appearing to them. The viewer, in having a new aspect light up and
exclaiming in response “now I see this!” acknowledges at once their current perception and
the perceptual shift that has occurred, but their recognition of the temporal dependency of
this change and its contingency to a previous visual appraisal belies a certain level of
cognizance on their part of both their former impression and how their current visual
impression is a disjunction from that previous appraisal. This is to say that when the new
aspect appears to the viewer, two impressions of the image are present for the viewer in
unison, not in a capacity where one and the other are seen in unison, but where the viewer
holds an awareness of their first sense impression in relation to the second.

they are important to note as curious challenges or exceptions to what else has been
suggested about visual perception thus far, and no doubt would complicate our sense of
seeing in relation to time passing.
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Does such a case qualify as one of perceptual seeing, then? While the viewer is
making a statement about their current perception, the awareness that they hold immediately
of their previous perception of the object in observing the new one, something which
developed in response to the viewer looking at the object and noticing it, but which itself is
not contained within the object, is not a detail of the object, but is an impression of it (not an
internal picture, but an awareness for the viewer of the image as it exists separate from the
viewer), makes the observation by the viewer here one that is not purely perceptual, where
thought is intermingling with how the viewer sees the object in the present. Again, this kind
of thinking may not be interpretive, but that the viewer is aware of something separate from
the object but related to their own engagement with it in the moment that they observe
something distinct makes plain that such a case as this one is not purely perceptual in the
sense that Wittgenstein’s initially proposed first mode of seeing seems to dictate. But the
statement made here isn’t patently non-perceptual; it’s simply not purely perceptual. Aspect
changes occur constantly in our engagement with images, and the moments where a new
mode of seeing occurs to the onlooker, where their whole sense of the object shifts, is one
of those instances where the intermingling between seeing and thinking occurs most
explicitly, most obviously. While the relationship between what thoughts occur to the viewer
at the moment at which they’ve seen anew and the manner in which their seeing of an image
has shifted remains varied case-by-case, and basically impossible to delineate definitively
from simply noting the seepage of the viewer’s cognitive concerns into their observing the
image in front of them, the occurrence of a seepage, or of a kind of blurring between
thought and vision, remains quite apparent.
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Wittgenstein addresses this matter just a few posits further into Part II Section XI,
when describing the case of an individual making an exclamation when they see a rabbit run
across a landscape in front of them. Wittgenstein writes:
I look at an animal; someone asks me: “what do you see?” I
answer:
“A rabbit.”—I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I
exclaim: “A rabbit!”
Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are
expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the
exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced
from us.—It stands to the experience somewhat as a cry to pain.
(Wittgenstein PII SXI p138)
In the first case here, the viewer is not actively thinking in relaying what it is they see.
The process in which they are engaging is one very much like that of the person responding
to “what is it?” in the duck-rabbit case who answers, “It’s a rabbit.” Their response appears
to be like a description, but it’s much more an identification of the object than anything else,
something where the kind of thinking that is occurring—if it can even really be termed
thought—is so immediate and second-nature that it happens almost unconsciously, and the
viewer, therefore, is not expressing any special awareness or cognizance to their position, to
their visual experience of the object, in simply saying “a rabbit.” They are reporting their
perception, which, again, given how language both shapes our perceptions, and how
intuitively we engage with language, does not require the viewer to be particularly careful or
considerate in supplying their response. Likewise, the visual experience the viewer is having
when they simply look at the rabbit and then report to another what it is they see is an
unassuming one, in that there is no facet to it as an experience for the viewer that makes the
viewer markedly cognizant that they are experiencing something, that dictates a particular need
to be thinking about seeing.
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But in the second case, where the viewer observes a landscape and, as a rabbit runs
across the landscape, exclaims “a rabbit!”, they are speaking of something that has shifted in
their immediate field of vision. That shift, which occurs suddenly, requires an awareness of
something changing for the viewer, and that possibility for the recognition of the shift
occurring as it occurs requires the viewer to be cognizant of the landscape as it was before
the rabbit ran across, and to register in contrast with the visual impression left during that
prior moment in time the new appearance of the rabbit. The viewer, then, to identify that
the impression that they held of the landscape has changed, must be cognizant at once of the
previous moment in time and the current one, and to hold the previous impression in mind
and contrast it with the current moment requires the viewer to be thinking about what it is at
which they are looking. But the second case is not a report in the manner that the first is, in
that the identification being made here is not as simple, is not something of the nature of the
response given to the question “what do you see?”. The exclamation “is forced from us,” as
Wittgenstein puts it, in that it springs out from the viewer upon noticing the rabbit,
identifying what it is, and then registering how the impression of the landscape has shifted
because of the rabbit’s running past. The registering of the rabbit and identifying it to be
such is much like the first case with the report, in that the viewer does not have to think
intensively to realize that what it is they are seeing is a rabbit; instead, much like the first case,
they look at the rabbit running past on the field and identify it to be a rabbit.
But what’s critically different here is that the individual looking at the landscape here
has noticed the manner in which that landscape has changed, and that the appearance of the
rabbit demarcates a shift. The exclamation that accompanies that shift, while it is as a
response something purely immediate, is a description of a perception, unlike in the first case,
where the remark of “a rabbit” is simply just a report of a perception. And this makes the
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meaning of Wittgenstein’s closing analogy between the exclamation at seeing the rabbit run
past and moments where people cry out in pain. In the case of the pain discussions upon
which Wittgenstein embarks during the first part of the Philosophical Investigations (like those
quoted at the beginning of this exploration into dreaming), much is done to delineate pain as
a sensation from those sorts of things we typically consider to be “known,” as it is a
sensation, something actually experienced internally by an individual, that are by their very
nature, because of their immediacy and because of their behavior as sensations, are divorced
from thought. The cry that a person makes when they are injured, then, is not quite what
one would conceive of typically as language, and is certainly not what someone would
classify as attempt to express and convey the nature of that pain to an individual such that the
same experience is fully sensible to the other person and can be known (since, again, pain is not
the kind of thing that is known, but that is experienced), but it is in some way descriptive, in
that it relays to another that the person who has injured themselves is experiencing pain (it
does not purport to make that pain discretely sensible, but it makes plain that the pain is
being experienced).
The description in the case of a person crying out “Ow!” when they are in pain,
however, does not relay anything about how their sensation feels to them in the moment, and
in this way does not dictate that the individual in pain is thinking when they let fly the
exclamation; instead, it simply alerts another that they are currently experiencing pain. The
case of the viewer exclaiming “a rabbit!” when the rabbit bolts across the landscape in front
of them, by contrast, is one where they are actually describing their perception by letting out
the cry, since they are conveying, even if only through two words, that before they saw only
the landscape, but now they see a rabbit running across the landscape. The fact that their
perception is one that consists of moving parts and that is contingent upon an array of
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different visual details interacting with one another in a particular context at a particular
moment in time requires that for the viewer to be able to make that perception something
that is evident and sensible to another, they are thinking about those contingencies and those
multiple facets of what they see when they let out “a rabbit!” Wittgenstein clarifies this
matter in his next posit, writing:
But since the exclamation is the description of a perception, one
can also call it the expression of thought.—Someone who looks at
an object need not think of it; but whoever has the visual
experience expressed by the exclamation is also thinking of what he
sees. (Wittgenstein PII SXI p139)
To identify something in an object, to look at an object and see it, a person does not need to
engage in thought; they need only look at the object and notice it, and the noticing of the
object or the image does not require that person to think about the object or to deliberate
upon how they are appraising it visually. To be able to report what someone sees when
looking at an object, they need only supply through what they say the identification they’ve
made in that object. But actually to describe the perceptual experience of the thing, to relay
through language more than just the identification of the object or the observation of the
image and give voice to the perception that they’ve had, or that they are having in the
moment, a person must be thinking about that perception, must be thinking about it in
order to engage with it in language and to try and relay it through description.
In the case where someone is shown an image of a smiling face and asked what they
see, when they respond “a smile,” they are not actually describing their perception. Instead,
they are identifying the image at which they are looking, what they’ve noticed through their
perception. But if the person in the same case responds by saying “I see two eyes, next to
each other, and beneath those, I see a mouth, pulled together into a smile,” they are
supplying description not of what they saw, but of their seeing, and this kind of description
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of the perception requires the individual to be thinking about seeing in the moment. It seems
obvious here that we are in danger of suggesting that thinking seeps into all acts of seeing,
that seeing and thinking are inextricable from one another; such a suggestion would invite
the consideration of the idea that an accurate appraisal is an impossibility, since all acts of
seeing then would be ones mediated by thought. We will not put to bed this concern about
thinking intermingling with seeing in all cases where our eyes are open and we are looking at
objects and images in the world around us here. But what will be put to rest here, and which
previous passages of this paper have been meticulously defusing piece-by-piece, is the idea
that all cases where thought saturates sight are cases where what’s occurring is interpretive,
are cases of seeing as. Wittgenstein writes in the posit 140 that: “And that’s why the lighting
up of an aspect seems half visual experience, half thought” (Wittgenstein PII SXI p140).
We’ve been through many cases so far where a new aspect appearing to a viewer is
markedly perceptual, or where what the viewer is seeing in the image is not resulting from an
interpretive gaze. If the viewer sees the duck in the duck-rabbit, and then sees the rabbit, and
does not arrive at these two separate visual appraisals by scrutinizing the image searching for
a separate mode of seeing, the byproduct of their sight is not something seen as; it is indeed
something seen. And multiple aspects absolutely exist for visual imagery; nothing we’ve said
so far suggests explicitly that there is one definitive mode of seeing for any particular image.
Aspects light up constantly for us when looking at things in the world, and those aspects are
by no means across-the-board deleterious or inaccurate. And indeed, if an aspect lighting up
to the viewer is half-though, half-visual experience, then it would mean that thinking is
heavily involved in an array of cases of seeing, where the thought present does not serve an
interpretive capacity, and where the viewer does not arrive at their new visual appraisal
through seeing an image in a certain light dictated by concerns, sentiments, sensibilities, and
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experiential concerns held by the individual in the moment that become projected onto the
image and that cause the viewer to notice details that aren’t not necessarily there, or to
identify in the image particular qualities not actually manifested visually.
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Dreaming, Revisited

In the Gallery (a concluding analogy)
Take another case: an individual goes to an art gallery to observe a sculpture
installation. In the atrium of the gallery someone is handing out copies of a booklet with a
figurative drawing of a swan on its cover, inside of which is an artist’s statement. The viewer
flips through the booklet as the walk from the atrium of the gallery into the actual gallery
space, reading over the artist statement and taking it into consideration as they move
towards the different sculptures. Here, sure, there is an element of anticipation at play, where
the viewer’s thoughts are informed by the statements that the artist makes about the work
being presented, about its formal qualities as they relate to thematic or conceptual concerns
that the artist hopes to evince through the works; this may seem an instance where the
presumption then about the works about to be seen will color the viewer’s perceptions in a
way where seeing in the first sense becomes an impossibility. But the viewer may not be so
attentive as they read through the leaflet, which doesn’t put to bed the idea that their seeing
of the works will be different than it would have if they’d foregone picking up the booklet
and flipping through it, but which also gives the impression that the viewer isn’t searching
out those qualities of the work discussed by the artist in the statement or isn’t having their
perception of the work schematized purely by the artist’s concerns, or at least that these
things are not happening on a conscious level. If Wittgenstein’s proposals about the duckrabbit, then, are correct—if indeed the report the viewer makes of what they see in the
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intuitive terms that suggest perception, and if then perception is at play, or the viewer
registers their seeing the gallery as chiefly a perceptual experience (as made plain through
their language usage), then it wouldn't follow to say that everything the viewer sees during
the show was seen as, or that their inspection of the works was patently interpretive. Again,
this case is one where thought interplays with seeing, but where that interplay does not mean
that the images seen are so mediated that the viewer’s impression of them is totally
adulterated and does not cohere at all with the images themselves. In addition, the presence
of thought here in relation to the act of seeing doesn’t necessarily suggest that what the
viewer is doing in looking at the images is interpretive.
For example, the viewer could just as easily forego taking the artist statement, make
their way through the gallery exhibition and look upon the many different sculptures
contained within, and through their inspection, through their seeing the sculptures, identify in
them qualities of the works the artist points to as being primary in the artist statement, see the
sculptures in a manner that carries fidelity to how the artist conceived of them during their
production (how the artist “saw” them, if you will). Here, the identification of those qualities
is in no way inflected by the artist’s trying to direct the viewer’s sense of the work through
language, and yet the qualities are still identified, even if they don’t take primacy in the
sculptures depicted, and even if their visual articulation carries with it a certain level of
subtlety (think of the Kantian conception of the “unmotivated engagement”). In this case,
then, do we say that the viewer is seeing the sculptures because of the identification? Do we
say that a person who does not notice those same qualities that this viewer has identified and
that the artist hoped to bring to form through the sculptural work isn’t seeing the image?
Presumably not, although the qualities being identified, being noticed in the visual
representation here, are not necessarily visual qualities in the terms that we’ve been discussing
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them, since they aren’t necessarily connected to something representational, they are not
contingent upon an identification in the same sense. But to say that what’s occurring here is
markedly non-perceptual, or relies explicitly on interpretation, seems too strong. This case
may be closer to interpretation than the previous one, although the fact that the viewer is
recognizing these qualities without the kind of previously-informed context, without
whatever lingering preconceptions might have come with reading the artist statement before
encountering the sculptures suggests a limit to the degree to which this can be treated as
interpretive seeing. If anything, this sort of case would be the kind that would warrant an
individual saying that the viewer of the sculptures is “especially perceptive” or especially
“astute,” and though such utterances may not betray explicitly what kind of seeing is
occurring when the individual looks at the sculptures totally fresh and notices in them those
qualities most central to the artist, most related to the individual works and to the exhibition
as a whole, they suggest that our conception of perceptive (not perceptual) seeing actually
accommodates already for an intermingling between thinking and seeing, where the thought
informing the perception isn’t necessarily something that would be classified as interpretive.
Again, though, this particular case relies heavily on the identification of qualities in an
object—a 3-dimensional one—that is made by an individual, that is designed by an artist, and
that therefore is crafted with a certain level of intention behind its design, an intention the
artist hopes an onlooker will identify. These issues of intention will not be touched on now,
although they do not totally refute or invalidate what other noticed qualities of visual
appraisal have been covered here, as the language usages that would be employed in this case
belie a great deal about our actual innate awareness of the presence of thought within
perceptual experiences.
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But what’s more, other imagery can inflect how a person sees something at which
they are looking presently just as much as a language utterance can inform a person’s
impression in of the current image being appraised. Let’s say the viewer goes to the art
gallery, takes one of the booklets containing the artist’s statement, but does not flip through
it, instead choosing to experience the exhibition “blind,” much in the manner that is
described in the previous case; however, they glance at the booklet’s cover, and notice the
swan. Maybe they make a slight note of it before entering the exhibition space; maybe they
barely register it at all. The viewer, in looking at the swan, automatically assumes a kind of
context in which the sculptural work is to be appraised, one that carries over into their
looking at the different pieces and trying to glean from them a sense of at what it is they are
looking. This influence is likely an unconscious one, but it still informs how it is the viewer
engages with the work that they are seeing. Here, the image on the cover behaves much like
the images framing the duck-rabbit in posit 125, where they inflect the manner in which the
viewer actually sees the image. Unlike in the duck-rabbit case, though, the sculptures are not
being taken in concurrently with the image of the swan (unless the gallery goer is glancing
down constantly throughout their time in the space at the duck on the cover of the booklet
in an obsessive manner, although we wouldn’t realistically expect this course of action to be
taken by someone in a gallery space), are not “framing” the sculptures in the same manner
that is at play with the two large images of duck-rabbit with ducks surrounding it in one,
with rabbits in the other, or are at least not “framing” the sculptures in the same sense that
was at play earlier. Instead, the viewer has an awareness at the back of their mind of the
swan, which, though they may not mean for it to do so, will bubble up into their mind in one
capacity or another while they gaze at the sculptures on display. They may not even be
cognizant immediately of the association they draw between the swan and the sculptures, or
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of associations between swans—or the particular image of the swan—and other elements of
their own experience that inflect their sense of the sculptures, of the manner in which they
engage with the sculptures visually.
Again, the kind of influence held over the act of seeing occurring here is one that is
inflected by a previous association, by a sort of direction in which the viewer is guided based
on the image of the swan. Unlike the artist statement, however, and unlike the cases where
the viewer of the Picasso painting is “guided” to observe certain qualities of the painting and
then from taking in those qualities comes to see anew, here, the image that informs the
manner in which they see the sculptures in the exhibition is susceptible to the same kinds of
phenomenon that are at play in the other cases, and so the particular manner in which the
viewer sees the swan inflects how that image realigns their sense of the installation as a whole.
In this sense, the viewer’s seeing the sculptural exhibit in the context of the swan image
appears unlike the cases where language uses affect visual appraisal, since the swan image is
prone to the same kinds of ambiguities that are at play with images generally, and which do
differ from ambiguities in language. Likewise, how the viewer sees the installation differently
because of the swan on the booklet cover isn’t directed in the manner that looking at the
Picasso painting after being told to notice particular details is, and isn’t “guided” by the
image in the way it is by the language of the artist’s statement in the first of these gallery
cases. This case likely registers immediately as falling in line with seeing as, as it is described
at the outset of Wittgenstein’s Part II Section XI, in that the seeing here, based purely on
how it is described above, seems to be interpretive (like the case of a person looking at 2
images and saying of them “I see a likeness between them). But the way in which a person
sees the sculptures after encountering the image of the swan is not necessarily one where
certain affinities between the sculptures and the swan image rise to the fore; indeed, it is
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unclear here if the intention of the artist in sharing the swan image on the cover of the
booklet is to draw attention to similarities between that image or between the swan—as it
exists in reality—and the sculptures presented. It’s still possible, even, that the viewer looks
at the sculptures and identifies in them those same qualities to which the artist gives voice in
their statement, those same components of the sculptures that are identified by the
“perceptive” viewer in the second case.
Whether the swan aids in that identification here isn’t immediately evident, but the
image doesn’t seem to detract from the ability for the viewer to notice those aspects. Here,
the associations conjured up by the swan no doubt seep into the viewer’s appraisal of the
sculptures, but whether the manner in which those images inflect the sense of the sculptures
is interpretive, whether they operate in such a way that they adulterate the viewer’s actual
perception of the sculptures, is not clear. Whether that’s even what is at play here, in fact, is
unclear, and it is for this reason that it seems too strong a phrasing to call the seeing that
occurs here “interpretive” seeing. The viewer does not necessarily “overlay” the swan, or the
associations that come with it, onto the sculptures. In fact, the framing image here may
actually bring to a relief qualities of the image that otherwise wouldn’t be noticed, elements
of the sculpture that would not immediately register if not for the frame. Again, this relates
to “intention,” but not in the manner that the previous case does. What’s at play here is
much closer to how dreams behave, where sequences of images, or patterns of scenarios,
follow each other in a succession that, though the actual images and experiences register as
being “real” to the dreamer while they sleep, are generated by the dreamer in a manner
dictated likely by some kind of concern at play within their unconscious, the kind of concern
that likely must be identified through interpretation through the relaying of the dream to
another while the dreamer is awake.
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In fact, the analogy here can be made even stronger: the dreamer and the person in
the gallery aren't just engaging in similar ventures into perceiving imagery and unearthing
from those perceptions concerns central to the manner in which the image has been
produced. The dreamer is in the gallery, is wandering past the sculptures, noticing their many
different visual facets, their curvature, their formal facets, their position in the space, the
manner in which they’ve been crafted and molded with a fine attunement to detail, and is
attempting to deduce, through the inspection of the images individually, and in concert with
one another, and with the remarks made in the artist statement, with a consideration of the
swan on the cover of the booklet, those elements at play in the individual images, and those
facets shared across the different cases, which, when taken together, bring a radical and new
understanding to the installation as a whole. This is precisely what the dreamer does in
interpreting the dreams that they’ve had; they are attempting to have that other side of their
life, the one that, though it bears some striking resemblances to waking life, occurs
differently, behaves differently, reflects on the events experience during waking in a way that
cannot occur in consciousness, where the unconscious is free to abound, and to try and
impart through things that so closely resemble experience, that so seem like experience within
the dream, those many different associations, considerations, sentiments, resting underneath
everything of our waking life, which are equally as responsible for our sense of self, our
sentiments about the world, our awareness of the things around us and of ourselves.
“It will depend on how the question is used”
For interpretation to be possible, for the dreamer to actually forego the process of
uncovering those unconscious concerns that appeared in sleep as imagery and as sensation,
an intricate engagement must occur with the dream as it occurs, not just as it is remembered
by the dreamer. Those sensations and the immediacy they held for the individual while they
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dreamt must be reclaimed, must be reinvestigated, until the underlying elements of the
dream, which are interwoven with how the dream is experienced while it is happening, can be
exposed to light and reclaimed. Freud says that a dream is nothing more than the memory of
the dream. Of this, Wittgenstein writes
People who on waking tell us certain incidents (that they have
been in such-and-such places, and so forth). Then we teach them
the expression “I dreamt”, which is followed by the narrative.
Afterwards I sometimes ask them, :did you dream anything last
night?” and am answered Yes or No, sometimes with a dream
narrative, sometimes not. That is the language-game….Does this
mean that it is nonsense ever to raise the question of whether
dreams really take place during sleep, or are a memory
phenomenon of the awakened? It will depend on how the question
is used (Wittgenstein SII PVII p52-53)
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